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Jurisdiction
This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78-2-2(3)(j), which gives this Court jurisdiction over "orders, judgments, and
decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals does not have
original appellate jurisdiction"; and Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3, which generally does
not give the Court of Appeals original appellate jurisdiction over civil matters
originating in the district court which are neither administrative nor domestic.
Issues Presented on Appeal
Is an action for back wages under the Utah Payment of Wages act, Utah Code
Ann. Title 34, Ch. 28 (hereinafter referred to as the "UPW"), an action for the same
loss as an action for back wages and overtime under the federal Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 USC §201, et. seq. (hereinafter referred to as the "FLSA")?
If a separate federal action is recognized, is an employee who is also a pro
se attorney entitled to attorney's fees under 29 USC §216(b)?
If a separate federal action is recognized, is an employee entitled to
liquidated damages under 29 USC §216(b)?

The employee seeks an award of

liquidated damages in the sum of $3,544.80 pursuant to that section.
May an employee who is also a pro se attorney have his right to attorney's
fees under Utah Code Ann. §34-27-1 be extinguished on equitable principles? The
appellant also seeks attorney's fees for this appeal.
In considering an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, the appellate
court views the facts in a light most favorable to the losing party below. And in
determining whether those facts require, as a matter of law, the entry of judgment
for the prevailing party below, the appellate court gives no deference to the trial

court's conclusions of law, which are reviewed for correctness. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield v State, 779 P2d 634 (Utah 1989).
Determinative Statutes
Utah Code Ann. §34-28-2(2) provides:
The word "wages" means all amounts due the employee for
labor or services, whether the amount is fixed or ascertained on a
time, task, piece, commission basis or other method of calculating
such amount.
Copies of Utah Code Unann., Vol. 2, pages 266 and 267 (1989), which includes
the full language of §§34-26-4 to 34-28-8 and copies of Utah Code Unann. Vol. 4,
pages 666 and 667 (1989), which include the full language of Rule 4-505, R. Jud.
Admin., are included in Appellant's addendum.
29 USC §207(a)(l) provides in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, no employer shall employ
any of his employees . . . for a workweek longer than forty hours
unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in
excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and
one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.
29 USC §216(b) provides in pertinent part:
Any employer who violates the provisions of section 6 or section 7 of
this Act [29 USC §§ 206 or 207] shall be liable to the employee or
employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or
their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an
additional equal amount as liquidated damages. . . . The court in such
action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or
plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney f s fee to be paid by the
defendant, and costs of the action.
The full language of 29 USCS §§206, 207, 216, and 260, with amendments, are
included in Appellant's addendum.
Utah Code Ann. §34-27-1 provides:
Whenever a mechanic, artisan, miner, laborer, servant, or other
employee shall have cause to bring suit for wages earned and due

according to the terms of his employment and shall establish by the
decision of the court that the amount for which he has brought suit is
justly due, and that a demand has been made in writing at least
fifteen days before suit was brought for a sum not to exceed the
amount so found due, then it shall be the duty of the court before
which the case shall be tried to allow to the plaintiff a reasonable
attorneys* fee in addition to the amount found due for wages, to be
taxed as costs of suit.
Statement of the Case
Smith brought an action against his former employers for back wages and
overtime under both state and federal law. Defendants answered, but failed to
timely responded to Smith's discovery or meaningfully oppose Smith's motion for
summary judgment. Summary judgment partially granting Smith's state claim and
completely denying Smith's federal claim was given in the Second Judicial District
Court for Davis County, Judge Douglas Cornaby presiding. The denials were based
upon conclusions of law with no factual issues remaining to be determined by trial.
Defendants' subsequent motions, including one to set aside judgment, were denied.
Relevant Facts
This statement of facts assumes that Smith's requests for admissions were
deemed admitted by defendants pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 36(a) and that Smith's
statement of material facts in his motion for summary judgment were deemed
admitted pursuant to Rule 4-501(5), R. Jud. Admin. A Copy of Smith's uncontroverted statement of material facts from his memorandum of points and authorities
in support of motion for summary judgment and motion for order compelling
discovery from defendants are included in Appellant's addendum.
Stephen Smith was hired in March, 1989 by Larry Peterman to do computer
work for Movie Buffs, a dba for Janae Kingston, Mr. Peterman's wife, with stores
in Utah and Wyoming (Index pg. 87, U5; pg. 89, 1JH27-30). Dorothy Batchelor, Ms.

Kingston's mother, acted as the personnel manager of the business (Index Pg. 89,
1130-31). Smith is also a licensed attorney who provided some legal services to
Movie Buffs during his employment (Index pg. 87, 1111 9, 11, & 13).
A wage dispute between the parties resulted in Smithfs termination of his
employment and subsequent written demands for overtime compensation and back
wages in August, 1989 for the sum of $2,657.95 (Index pp. 35-41). Other than a
check for one week's wages in the sum of $190.28 (Index pg. 26, 1114), Smith
received no written reply to his demands, resulting in this action being filed by
Smith pro se on September 20, 1989.
Smith claimed in his complaint (Index pp. 1-4), and submitted unopposed
evidence to the court (Index pp. 23-84), that he was due the sum of $3,544.80 in
back wages, comprised of 22.05 regular hours and 188.15 overtime hours (Index pg.
3, U13) based upon an hourly wage of $11.65 per hour (Index pg. 3,118; pg. 88, 11111924). Smith also sought a $4,000.00 penalty provided for under Utah Code Ann. §3428-5(2), liquidated damages equal to the amount sought in back wages and overtime
under the FLSA, and attorney's fees for his time expended as an attorney in pursuing
this matter under both Utah Code Ann. §34-27-1 and the FLSA (Index pp. 3-4).
Defendants answered (Index pg. 11-17), denying any obligation to Smith and
raising the defense that Smith was salaried administrative personnel exempt from
application of the FLSA, who provided most of his services to Movie Buffs as an
attorney (Index pg. 11). The affirmative defenses of waiver, laches, and estoppel
were also generally raised (Index pg. 16).
Discovery was commenced by Smith by mail on October 6, 1989 for each
defendant, with certificates of service filed with the Court on October 10, 1989

(Index pp. 18-20). The packages included requests for admissions, interrogatories,
and requests for production of documents (Index pp. 42-79). Corrections to the
discovery requested were also mailed by letters on October 6, 1989 (Index pg. 80)
and October 12, 1989 (Index pg. 81). The October 12 letter contained the following
language omitted from Smith's discovery requests: "please be advised that, pursuant
to rule 36, the matters shall be deemed admitted unless said request is responded
to within 30 days after service of the request or within such shorter or longer times
as the court may allow."
Smith moved for summary judgment on November 15, 1989 (Index pp. 21-22),
basing his motion upon various exhibits, his affidavit (Index pp. 23-84), and the
assertion that the requests for admission were now deemed admitted (Index pp. 8990). Smith filed an affidavits for attorney's fees pursuant to Rule 4-505, R. Jud.
Admin. (Index pp. 23-29).

Certificates of service of defendants' answers to

discovery were filed on December 1, 1989 (Index pp. 95-100) and an objection to
motion for summary judgment was filed with the court on December 7, 1989 (Index
pp. 101-102). The objection did not controvert Smith's statement of material facts.
On December 13, 1989, without hearing, Smith's motion was granted as to the
claim for $3,544.80 in back wages and for the $4,000.00 penalty provided by Utah
Code Ann. §34-28-5(2). While acknowledging that Smith had stated a claim under
Utah Code Ann. §34-27-1 for attorneys fees, the motion was denied in equity. The
federal FLSA claims were denied as a claim for the same loss under state law.
Defendants' requests for admissions were deemed admitted (Index pp. 115-116). An
order of judgment conforming to the ruling was signed and entered on January 16,
1990 (Index pp. 118-121). A Copy of the order is included in Appellant's Addendum.

On January 19, 1990 defendants filed their motion to set aside the judgment
granted on December 13, 1989 and for permission to withdraw or amend their
admissions, supported by an affidavit of counsel and a memoranda (Index pp. 122133). Smith's reply was filed on February 5, 1990 (Index pp. 134-138) and the matter
was submitted for decision without hearing. A signed order denying defendants'
motion was entered on February 27, 1990 (Index pg. 143-145).
Smith filed an amended notice of appeal to the Supreme Court on March 28,
1990 (Index pp. 152-153). Defendants filed a notice of appeal to the Court of
Appeals on March 29, 1990 (Index pg. 155) and a notice of cross-appeal to the
Supreme Court on May 8, 1990.
Summary of Arguments
The UPW addresses the failure of the employer to pay wages to the employee
at regular intervals or promptly upon termination. The FLSA is directed to the
different concern that the employee be paid certain minimum compensation and
additional compensation for work performed in addition to the normal work week.
Smith is not attempting to recover twice for the same loss of wages. But Smith is
asserting that an employer who fails to pay overtime compensation and who
subsequently fails to pay at all is subject to both of the penalties provided by the
two separate and distinct statutes.
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that an award of liquidated
damages pursuant to 29 USC §216(b) is mandatory upon the courts. Overnight Motor
Transp. Co. v Missal, 316 US 572, 86 L Ed 1682, 62 S Ct 1216, reh den 317 US 706,
87 L Ed 563, 63 S Ct 76 (1942). This is now subject to the employer's evidence of
his good faith under 29 USC §260, which was subsequently enacted in 1947. No

evidence of good faith was presented by defendants, rendering 29 USC §260
inapplicable to this case.
An award of attorneys fees under 29 USC §216(b) is mandatory, Birbalas v
Cuneo Printing Industries, Inc., 140 F2d 826 (CA7 111 1944), Whittington v Roberts,
360 F Supp 335 (DC Miss 1973). Although a pro se action by a practicing attorney
for relief under the FLSA is novel to appellants knowledge, the preponderance of
federal decisions allow a pro se attorney an award of attorneys fees where otherwise
provided for by statute.
Utah Code Ann. §34-27-1 directs an award of attorney's fees under the facts
of this case, which was acknowledged by the district court. "Furthermore, contrary
to appellant's contention that attorneys fees should be determined on the basis of
an equitable standard, attorneys fees, when awarded as allowed by law, are awarded
as a matter of legal right." Cabrera v Cottrell, 694 P2d 622, at 623 (Utah 1985).
The language of the statute and the preponderance of states deciding the matter
have allowed attorneys fees to pro se attorneys who are otherwise entitled to an
award of fees.
Argument
Actions Under The State & Federal Laws Are Not For The Same Loss
Under the Supremacy clause of Article VI of the Constitution of the United
States, the FLSA supersedes the UPW to the extent of any inconsistency, Butte
Miners' Union v Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 118 P2d 148 (Mont 1941), Elkins v
Showcase, Inc., 704 P2d 977 (Kan 1985); but no inconsistency exists. The FLSA has
not pre-empted state regulation nor the imposition of state remedies for violations
arising out of the same circumstances, Davis v Jobs for Progress, Inc., 427 F Supp

479 (DC Ariz 1976).
The UPW makes no reference to overtime wages, defining only "wages" under
Utah Code Ann. §34-28-2(2) as generally "...amounts due the employee for labor or
services...". §7(a)(l) of the FLSA, 29 USC §207(a)(l), establishes overtime wages at
"...one and one-half times the regular rate...". Nowhere do the two statutes make
reference to each other. It is logically inconsistent that Smith could be awarded the
full amount prayed for back wages without implicitly awarding Smith the value
established by federal law for the overtime hours claimed.
The penalty provisions of the federal and state statutes address different
concerns. 29 USC §216(b) awards liquidated damages and attorney's fees against an
employer who fails to pay the minimum and overtime wages required by the FLSA.
An employee does not have to terminate his employment in order to bring an action
under the FLSA. In contrast, the 60 days wages penalty of Utah Code Ann. §34-285(2) only applies "[wjhenever an employer separates an employee from his payroll..."
under Utah Code Ann. §34-28-5(1). It addresses the employer's delay in the payment
of the employee's wages at termination. The amount of wages due at termination
must then be determined by reference to the employment agreement between the
employer and the employee as modified to the extent required by the FLSA. Each
statute has its own distinct elements to be plead and proved.
Smith not only lost his uncompensated overtime wages, he also lost the
prompt payment of his wages, including regular wages, when his employment was
terminated.
Where the complaint alleges a violation by the defendant in failing to pay
overtime compensation, the trial court errs in failing to make findings on the issue,

Tobin v Anthony-Williams Mfg. Co., 196 F2d 547 (CA8 Ark 1952).
Liquidated Damages are Mandatory
The liquidated damages provision of 29 USC §216(b) was determined to be
mandatory by the Supreme Court in Overnight, supra. However, in 1947, Congress
enacted 29 USC §260 to address more specifically the liquidated damages provision
of 29 USC §216(b), allowing the employer to show to the satisfaction of the court
"...that the act or omission giving rise to such action was in good faith and that he
had reasonable grounds for believing that his act or omission was not a violation..."
of the FLSA.
The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the discretion of the court
in awarding liquidated damages under 29 USC §260 is invoked only if the employer
carries the burden of showing both that he acted in good faith and that he had
reasonable grounds for believing that he had not violated the Act, and that the trial
courts errs in refusing to award liquidated damages where it makes no finding that
the employer had reasonable grounds for believing that it had complied with the
Act. Sinclair v Automobile Club of Oklahoma, Inc., 733 F2d 726 (CA10 Okla 1984).
The 10th Circuit held in the companion case that proof of the employer's good faith
is a prerequisite for the exercise of the court's discretion under 29 USC §260. Doty
vElias, 733 F2d 720 (CA10 Okla 1984). See also Liquidated Damages for Violations
of Wage and Hour Provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act, 26 ALR Fed 607. Where
no evidence was submitted by defendants, Smith must be awarded liquidated
damages.
Attorney's Fees Under Federal Law
Questions concerning the fixing of reasonable attorney's fees in actions

brought under 29 USC §216(b) are governed exclusively by federal law, Eakin v
Ascension Parish Police Jury, 294 So2d 527 (La 1974). These fees are an integral
part of the employeefs recovery and cannot be considered as "costs™ incident to
recovery, Caperna v Williams-Bauer Corp., 185 Misc 687, 57 NYS2d 254, aff'd 186
Misc 27, 58 NYS2d 876 (NY 1945), J. F. Schneider & Son, Inc. v Justice, 293 Ky 126,
168 SW2d 591 (Ky 1943).
The provision for assessing attorney's fees against a defendant employer
under the FLSA is for the purpose of fostering justifiable litigation without expense
to the employee-plaintiff, Hutchinson v William C. Barry, Inc., 50 F Supp 292 (DC
Mass 1943). An award of attorney's fees pursuant to 29 USC §216(b) is not made to
the plaintiff's attorney, but is part of the judgment recovered by the employee, to
whom the attorney must look for payment, Ferraro v Arthur M. Rosenberg Co., 156
F2d 212, (CA2 Conn 1946), Re L. E. Elliot Brokerage Co., 48 F Supp 144 (DC Kan
1942). Statutorily authorized attorney's fees, such as those under 29 USC §216(b),
are to be treated like contractually stipulated fees, Johnson v University of
Bridgeport, 629 F2d 828 (CA2 Conn 1980).
The factors to be considered in setting attorney's fees awards in federal civil
rights litigation under 42 USC §1988 were stated in Hensley v Eckerbart, 461 US
424, 103 S Ct 1933, 76 L Ed 2d 40 (1983). These factors were applied to FLSA cases
in Kreager v Solomon and Flanagan, P.A., 775 F2d 1541, 27 BNA WH Cas 689, 103
CCH LC H34717, 3 FR Serv 3d 225 (CA11 Fla 1985).
The 12 factors are: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty
and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the
legal services properly; (4) the preclusion of employment of the
attorney due to the acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6)
whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by
the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the

results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and the ability of the
attorneys; (10) the "undesirability" of the case; (11) the nature and
length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards
in similar cases. 488 F2d, at 717-719.
461 US at 428, note 3.
Where pro se attorneys have rendered legal services compensable under 42
USC §1988, the cases deciding the issue have uniformly held that they may be
awarded attorney's fees, Duncan v Poythress, 111 F2d 1508 (CAll Ga 1985), Ellis
v Cassidy, 625 F2d 227 (CA9 Hawaii 1980), Rybicki v State Bd. of Elections, 584 F
Supp 849 (ND 111 1984), Lanasa v City of New Orleans, 619 F Supp 39 (ED La 1985).
See also Award of Attorneys' Fees to Pro Se Litigant Under 42 USCS §1988, 82 ALR
Fed 800. Where the pro se litigant is not an attorney, attorney's fees claimed under
42 USC §1988 have been denied, Turman v Tuttle, 711 F2d 148 (CA10 Colo 1983).
It should be noted that 42 USC §1988 awards "...a reasonable attorney's fee
as part of the costs." This language does not appear to be as forceful as 29 USC
§216(b)fs award of attorney's fees as part of the judgment, Ferraro, supra.
The general reasons given for allowing attorney's fees to pro se civil rights
litigants who are attorneys are enlightening: There is no express prohibition in the
statute, Duncan, supra.; it promotes the statutory purpose, Lanasa, supra, and
Duncan, supra; such awards promote and encourage representation by competent
counsel, Lanasa, supra, and Rybicki, supra; there is no difficulty in establishing the
value of the legal services rendered where there is an established billing and fee
practice, Rybicki, supra, and Ellis, supra; actual pecuniary loss is incurred from the
effect that the litigation has on the pro se attorney's private practice in time and
overhead, Rybicki, supra, Ellis, supra, and Duncan, supra.
Those same considerations apply when a pro se attorney is forced to sue for

his wages earned in a different capacity. 29 USC §216(b) does not prohibit the
award of attorney's fees to pro se attorney litigants. An award would further the
FLSA!s statutory purpose and would encourage employees to obtain competent legal
representation of their claims. This litigation has been conducted to preserve as
much judicial economy as possible. Smith has thus far substantially prevailed.
Smith has submitted to the district court affidavits of attorney's fees supported by
contemporaneous time records. These affidavits are the same as required of, and
which must be submitted by, any attorney attempting to recover attorney's fee
under contract or statute, pursuant to Rule 4-505, R. Jud. Admin.
Most importantly, to deny Smith an award of attorney's fees would violate
the FLSAfs remedial purpose to not penalize the plaintiff-employee. To deny him
the value of the reasonable time expended as an attorney in bringing this matter to
a successful conclusion would be forcing him to expend, for free, billable time equal
to about half of the overtime sued for. In terms of actual professional cost, it will
render the judgment already awarded, plus the liquidated damages, if awarded, a
virtual nullity.

Further, it will encourage defendants to engage in as many

prolonged legal delays as possible, without fear of any consequences for liability for
attorney's fees under Rule 11 or the other provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Clearly, a pro se attorney who can not obtain reasonable attorney's fees
under the non-discretionary provisions of the FLSA or the UPW will not be entitled
to the discretionary compensations provided for under the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Attorney's Fees Under State Law
Smith met the statutory requirements of the mandatory attorney's fees

provision of Utah Code Ann, §34-27-1, which the district court acknowledged.
Attorney's fees were denied anyway, "considering the equities in this case." With
Cabrera, supra, negating the equity argument as to attorney's fees, the remaining
issue to be decided by this Court is whether, under state law, a pro se attorney is
entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to a non-discretionary
statute. Utah Code Ann. §34-27-1 relevantly provides ?fit shall be the duty of the
court...to allow to the plaintiff a reasonable attorneys' fee..., to be taxed as costs
of suit."
The statute does not require that the fee actually be incurred. A "reasonable
attorney's fee" must also be paid to the prevailing party, without other limitation,
under the following sections of the Utah Code Ann.: §13-11-17.5, dealing with
violations of the Consumer Sales Practices Act, with fees awardable to "the
enforcing authority"; §13-21-9 for violations of the Credit Services Organizations
Act, with fees awardable to the Division of Consumer Protection; §13-23-7 for
violations of the Health Spas Act, with fees awardable to the Division of Consumer
Protection; §31 A-15-108 in actions against unauthorized insurers; §38-9-1 where
there is slander of title; §54-6-12 dealing with bad faith actions under the Motor
Carrier Act; §57-19-21 for agreements void under the Timeshare and Camp Resort
Projects Act; §70C-7-106(4), dealing with unconscionable credit agreements; §70C7-204, dealing with violations of the Utah Consumer Credit Code; §76-6a-6, in an
action to recover funds spent in a pyramid scheme; §76-10-1604, under the
Racketeering Enterprises Act; §78-11-15 and -16 where there is civil liability for
shoplifting; §78-23-13, which may be awarded in addition to the injunctive relief
obtained under the Utah Exemptions Act; and §78-27-56 for bad faith defenses.

It appears that the Utah Legislature has specifically allowed reasonable
attorney's fees to the prevailing party without further limitation in circumstances
where the allowance is intended as part of a full and complete compensation, and
where any possible windfall to the attorney will serve as both a punishment to the
transgressor and will encourage the bar to more actively secure the rights
protected. Further, it appears that some of the statutes anticipate actions by
enforcing authorities on their own behalf, using their own staff attorneys. These
actions by pro se attorney agencies are specifically allowed reasonable attorney's
fees in some instances, with the other statutes silent on the matter.
This analysis appears reasonable when examining the other statutes of the
Utah Code Ann. which, when awarding attorney's fees, at a minimum require that
they actually be incurred: §63-30c-2 for the reimbursement of public officers; §6363-18 to obtain compensation under the Victim Restitution Act; §75-3-718 as
reasonable compensation in probate proceedings; §78-11-10 and §78-16-3 in actions
against officers; §78-27a-3, under the Small Business Equal Access to Justice Act;
and §78-37-9 where claimed as a part of the plaintiff's foreclosure. These statues
are directed more at reimbursement and actual compensation for costs incurred or
services rendered by the affected party.
It appears that Utah is fortunate to have a legislature capable of drafting
statutes that actually mean what they say, unlike the states of Idaho and Louisiana,
where the appellate courts concluded that statutes with unlimited reasonable
attorney's provisions were meant to exclude the reasonable attorney's fees of a pro
se attorney, Swanson v Setzke, Chtd., 11A P2d 909 (Idaho App 1989), Golden v
Riverside Apartments,

Inc.,, 488 So2d 478 (La App 3d Cir 1986).

The logic in

Swanson, supra, is that there is no attorney-client relationship. This argument found
support in Arizona in Connor v Cal-Az Properties, Inc., 668 P2d 896 (Ariz App 1983).
Golden's, supra, logic is that the expenses must be out-of-pocket. See also Right
of Party Who is Attorney and Appears for Himself to Award of Attorneyfs

Fees

Against Opposing Party as Element of Costs, 78 ALR3d 1119.
The majority of the states recently deciding the issue have allowed an award
of attorney's fees to pro se attorneys, although this conclusion was disputed by the
court in Swanson, supra, at 910, Burrell v Hanger, 650 P2d 386 (Alaska 1982),
Renfrew v Loysen, 175 Cal App 3d 1105, 222 Cal Rptr 413 (Cal 2d Dist 1985), Wells
v Whinery, 192 NW2d 81 (Mich App 1971), Winer v Jonal Corp., 545 P2d 1094 (Mont
1976), Friedman v Backman, 453 So2d 938, 9 FLW 1767 (Fl App D4 1984), People v
Lawless, 100 111 App 3d 74, 55 111 Dec 399, 426 NE2d 545 (111 App 1981), McMahon
v Schwartz, 109 Misc 2d 80, 438 NYS2d 215 (NY 1981), Hamilton v Telex Corp., 625
P2d 106 (Okla 1981). The reasons given for allowing attorney's fees to pro se
attorneys are similar to the ones given by the federal courts cited above.
One of the best analysis was made in Weaver v Laub, 574 P2d 609 (Okla 1977)
which involved attorneys seeking fees for themselves in a partition action. To avoid
the problems of bad faith actions and unnecessary work, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court made the additional requirement of pro se attorneys that they attest under
oath to the good-faith of the reasonable and necessary services rendered, and submit
an itemized billing, giving the time spent on, and an explanation of, each item, 574
P2d 609, at 613.
These requirements are met, for the most part, in Utah's Rule 4-505, R. Jud.
Admin, for attorney's fees affidavits.

The first two parts of the Rule address

different concerns. The first part requires the attorney to affirm, under oath, the
number of hours, the work performed, and the reasonableness of the fees sought for
comparable legal services. This allows a pro se attorney, or, say, a salaried attorney
with an enforcing authority, to add up his hours at his hourly rate, if available, or
the prevailing rate, if not, examine the result achieved, and then make a claim for
reasonable services based, not upon actual cost, but upon what comparable services
by a private hourly attorney would cost to achieve the result obtained. If the actual
cost to the client is not the same as the amount claimed in the first part of the
Rule, the second part requires the attorney to disclose the terms and conditions of
the arrangement.
This bifurcation of the Rule between an affirmation of the "reasonableness
of the fees for comparable legal services" under 4-505(1) R. Jud. Admin, and the
required disclosure of fee arrangements with clients which are "other than at an
hourly rate" under 4-505(2) R. Jud. Admin, demonstrates an understanding that the
issue to be decided in awarding fees against a party is not how reasonable the fees
are to the client, but how reasonable is the award against the paying party? The
two charges are usually, but not necessarily, identical.
Those who contemplate a violation of a statute that, without exception,
awards reasonable attorney f s fees should know that those fees, when awarded, will
be based upon the prevailing rate for professional services, regardless of whether
the attorney for the prevailing party is salaried, pro se, pro bono, with a governmental agency, or with a nonprofit organization. The Supreme Court has recognized this
distinction, holding that reasonable fees under 42 USC §1988 are to be calculated
according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community regardless of

whether the prevailing party is represented by private or nonprofit counsel, Blum
v Stenson, 465 US 886, 79 L Ed 2d 891, 104 S Ct 1541, (1984).
Conclusion
Smith has established a record of uncontroverted evidence that establishes
a claim for wages under the FLSA. Pursuant to 29 USC §216(b), Smith is entitled
to an award of liquidated damages against defendants in the sum of $3,544.80, and
an order that the order of judgment be amended to reflect the additional amount of
award. Having established his right to an award of attorney f s fees under 29 USC
§216(b) and pursuant Utah Code Ann. §34-27-1, Smith is also entitled to an order
remanding this case to the district court for a determination of Smithfs reasonable
attorney's fee both at the trial and appellate level, to include an order that the
judgment be amended to included the fees awarded and, further, that it contain the
language for augmentation contained in Rule 4-505(3), R. Jud. Admin.
Dated this 31st Day of May, 1990.
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY
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Stephen R. Smith, Jr.
Plaintiff,
vs.
Dorothy K. Batchelor, Larry Peterman,
and Janae Kingston dba Movie Buffs,

:
:
:
:
:

ORDER OF JUDGMENT

Defendants.

:

JUDGE: CORNABY

Civil NO: CV 46197

—oooOooo—
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment came before the Court for ruling pursuant
to a Notice to Submit for Decision on December 13, 1989, the Honorable Douglas L.
Cornaby presiding.

Plaintiff appeared pro se and all Defendants were represented by

counsel, Pete N. Vlahos. Plaintiff's Motion was filed November 15, 1989.

Defendants

responded to Plaintiff's Motion with a general objection filed on December 7, 1989, alleging
generally that there are issues of fact to be resolved by trial, but without stating any legal
reason why Plaintiff's Motion should not be granted.
The factual basis for Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment relies upon Plaintiff's
Affidavit and Requests for Admissions deemed admitted pursuant to URCP Rule 36(a),
which provides in relevant part:

FiU&D

The request for admission shall contain a notice advising the party to whom
the request is made that, pursuant to Rule 36, the matters shall be deemed
admitted unless said request is responded to within 30 days after service of
the request or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow.
Plaintiff mailed Requests for Admissions directed to each Defendant on October 6,
1989. On October 12, 1989, Plaintiff mailed a special notice to counsel for Defendants to
advise his clients that, regarding the Requests for Admissions, and "pursuant to rule 36, the
matters shall be deemed admitted unless said request is responded to within 30 days after
service of the request or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow."
Commencing the time period to answer Plaintiff's Requests from the date of said notice,
and allowing three days for mail, the time to answer Plaintiff's Requests for Admissions
expired on November 15, 1989. Defendants filed certificates of Service of Discovery dated
November 30, 1989, or 15 days late. Under Rule 36, the Requests for Admissions directed
to each Defendant are deemed admitted.
Each Defendant has admitted and Plaintiff's Affidavit is evidence that Plaintiff is
owed $3,544.80 in back wages. Therefore, Plaintiff is awarded judgment for $3,544.80 in
back wages.
Plaintiff made written demand for immediate payment for back wages totaling
$2,657.95 immediately after his employment ceased.

Defendants have not paid, and

Plaintiff has established that he was entitled to more than the dollar amount of the back
wages demanded. Plaintiff was paid $2,000.00 per month when last employed. Pursuant
Utah Code §34-28-5(2), Plaintiff is entitled to have his wages continue for a period of up

to 60 days from the date of demand until paid. Plaintiff is awarded an additional penalty
against Defendants of $4,000.00.
Plaintiff also asks for attorneys fees. Plaintiff is an attorney. While Utah Code
§34-27-1 calls for attorneys fees, the court believes that the award of the $4,000.00
penalty is sufficient considering the equities in this case. Plaintiff's motion for attorney's
fees is denied.
Plaintiff has also requested recovery under provisions of federal law.

Plaintiff

cannot recover under both federal and state laws for the same loss. Plaintiff's motion for
back wages pursuant to USCS §206(a) is denied. Plaintiff's motion for overtime wages
pursuant to USCS §207(a)(l) is denied.

Plaintiff's motion for liquidated damages and

attorney's fees pursuant to USCS §216(b) is denied.
Based upon the record on file herein, the Court now
Orders, Adjudges, and Decrees:
Plaintiff is awarded Judgment against Defendants Dorothy K. Batchelor, Larry
Peterman, and Janae Kingston dba Movie Buffs, jointly and severally, in the sum of
$7,544.80, plus Costs in the amount of $

.

interest at the rate of 12% per annum until paid.
Dated t h i s ^ th Day of January, 1990.

. Said Judgment and Costs shall bear

Approved as to Form:
Pete N. Vlahos
Attorney for Defendants

Judgement Debtors:
Name:

Dorothy K. Batchelor

Larry Peterman

Janae Kingston

West Point, Utah

West Point, Utah

Street:
City, State: Roy, Utah
Soc. Sec. #:

Certificate of Service
THIS WILL CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the forgoing Order of
Judgment was mailed, postage prepaid, to Pete N. Vlahos, attorney for Defendants, Vlahos,
Sharp, Wight, & Walpole, Legal Forum Building, 2447 Keisel Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401,
this 4th day of January, 1990.
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Telephone: (801) 364-5635
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
MOTION FOR ORDER COMPELLING
DISCOVERY FROM DEFENDANTS

Stephen R. Smith, Jr.
Plaintiff,
vs.
Dorothy K. Batchelor, Larry Peterman,
and Janae Kingston dba Movie Buffs,
Defendants.

Civil NO: CV 46197
JUDGE: CORNABY
—oooOooo—

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Stephen R. Smith, Jr., who respectfully submits the
following Points and Authorities in support of his Motion for Summary Judgment and
Motion for Order Compelling Discovery from Defendants.
Statement of Material Facts
Pursuant to RJA Rule 4-501(4), Plaintiff submits the following statement of
material facts as to which Plaintiff contends no genuine issue exists which are sufficient
to support a Motion for Summary Judgment:
1. On October 6, 1989 Plaintiff mailed two packages of discovery requests to
counsel for Defendants and mailed a Certificate of Service to the Clerk of Court for

i
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each of the three discovery requests. A copy of Plaintiff's first set of Requests for
Admissions, Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents upon each of the
Defendants is attached hereto and incorporated by reference as Plaintiff's Exhibit "Eff for
Defendant Janae Kingston, Plaintiff's Exhibit "F" for Defendant Larry Peterman, and
Plaintiff's Exhibit "G" for Defendant Dorothy K. Batchelor. Plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "B",
"Cff, and "D", attached to each of the discovery requests are also attached hereto and
incorporated herein by reference. A copy of a corrections letter mailed to counsel for
Defendants on October 6, 1989 and a follow-up letter mailed to counsel for Defendants
on October 12, 1989 are also attached hereto and incorporated by reference as Plaintiff's
Exhibits ffH" and "I". Plaintiff's Detail Time Usage Report of attorney's time and costs
is incorporated herein by reference as Plaintiff's Exhibit

,f ff

J .

Said exhibits shall

hereinafter be referred to as ffP-A" through "P-J" for brevity.
2.

Plaintiff

has received no reply to any of the discovery requests or

correspondence sent to counsel for Defendants and no response has been filed with the
Court.
3. Allowing three days for mail, the 30 days allowed for reply to discovery elapsed
on November 8, 1989.

Plaintiff's Certificates of Service for each of the discovery

requests was posted as received by the Clerk of Court on October 10, 1989.
4.

Pursuant to URCP Rule 36(a), Defendants have conclusively admitted the

following facts, which are additionally supported by the evidence of Plaintiff's affidavit
submitted herewith.

The Requests for Admissions shall hereinafter be referred to as

ff

RAB#" to each paragraph of the Requests for Admissions directed to Defendant Dorothy

K. Batchelor; as "RAK#" to each paragraph of the Requests for Admissions directed to
Defendant Janae Kingston; as "RAP#" to each paragraph of the Requests for Admissions
directed to Defendant Larry Peterman; and as "AFS#,f to each paragraph of the Affidavit
of Plaintiff Stephen R. Smith, Jr.
5.

Plaintiff worked for Movie Buffs from March 30, 1989 to August 3, 1989

(RAB#16&30, RAK#11,33&34 RAP#18,41&42, AFS#2&12).
6. P-A constitutes the agreement of employment between Plaintiff and Defendants
without amendment or revision (RAB#l-4, RAK#l-4, RAP#l-7, AFS#2).
7. Plaintiff was hired to provide computer services (P-A, AFS#2).
8. Plaintiff was not hired as an employee-attorney (P-A, RAB#15, RAP#17).
9. Most of Plaintiff's time of employment was not spent providing legal services
to Movie Buffs (RAB#14, RAK#9, RAP#15, AFS#15).
10. More than 90% of Plaintiff's time of employment was spent providing computer
services to Movie Buffs (RAK#10, RAP#16, AFS#15).
11. Only Defendant Larry Peterman ever requested Plaintiff to provide any legal
services (RAB#12, RAK#7).
12.

All Defendants required Plaintiff to provide computer services (RAB#13,

RAK#8, RAP#9).
13. Plaintiff provided little in the way of legal services (AFS#15).
14.

Each day recorded on P-B is an accurate record of the hours worked by

Plaintiff for Movie Buffs on that day (RAB#6&19, RAK#14, RAP#22, AFS#6).
15.

No other record of the hours worked by Plaintiff for Defendants exists

(RAB#20, RAK#16, RAP#24, AFS#4).
16. Plaintiff was not provided any other means to record his hours of employment
(RAB#9, RAK#17, AFS#4).
17. Defendants prevented Plaintiff from recording his hours of employment on
regular time-sheets (RAB#8, RAP#13&14, AFS#4).
18. Plaintiff regularly submitted incremental portions of P-B as his time records
to Defendant Batchelor (RAB#5, RAK#15, RAP#23, AFS#5).
19. Plaintiff worked at total of 790.2 hours (P-B, AFS#18).
20.

Plaintiff has been paid for 580 hours (P-B, RAB#29, RAK#32, RAP#40,

AFS#18).
21. Plaintiff was paid at the hourly rate of $11.65 per hour (RAB#28, RAK#31,
RAP#39, AFS#3&14).
22. Plaintiff has accrued 188.15 overtime hours (P-B, AFS#18).
23. Plaintiff has not been paid his regular wages for the period from July 24, 1989
through August 3, 1989 (RAB#17&18, RAK#12&13, RAP#20&21, AFS#14).
24. Defendants owe Plaintiff $3,544.80 in back wages (RAB#24, RAK#27, RAP#35,
AFS#20).
25.

Plaintiff made written demand for wages due and owing (P-C, P-D,

RAB#25&26, RAK#28&29, RAP#36&37, AFS#11-14).

26. Defendants are Residents of Davis County, state of Utah (fll Complaint, 511
Answer admitting).
27. Defendants are doing business in Utah and Wyoming as Movie Buffs, a dba
registered in the state of Utah under the name of Defendant Janae Kingston, with its
principle place of business in Layton, Davis County, state of Utah (fl2 Complaint, fll
Answer admitting).
28. Said business has stores in Utah and Wyoming, has more than 10 employees, and
is subject to the jurisdiction of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (fl3 Complaint, fll
Answer admitting).
29. Defendant Larry Peterman was the general manager of Movie Buffs and hired
Plaintiff (fl4 Complaint, Hi Answer admitting).
30. Defendant Dorothy K. Batchelor was the personnel manager and maintained
all employee records (fl5 Complaint, fl2 Answer admitting).
31. All defendants are employers and agents for each other. Dorothy K. Batchelor
is the mother of Janae Kingston, who in turn is the common-law wife of Larry Peterman
(516 Complaint, 513 Answer admitting).
Argument
Requests for Admissions Deemed Admitted
URCP Rule 36(a) provides in relevant part "the matters shall be deemed admitted
unless said request is responded to within 30 days after service of the request or within
such shorter or longer time as the court may allow." Such admissions are conclusively
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PETE N. VLAHOS, #3337
VLAHOS, SHARP, WIGHT & WALPOLE
Attorney for Defendants
Legal Forum Building
2447 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 621-2464

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STEPHEN R. SMITH, JR.
Plaintiff,
vs.
DORTHY K. BATCHELOR, LARRY
PETERMAN, and JANAE KINGSTON
dba
MOVIE BUFFS,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

OBJECTION TO MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

CIVIL NO: CV 46197

JUDGE: DOUGLAS L. CORNABY

COMES NOW the Defendants above-named, by their attorney, Pete N. Vlahos, and herein object to the granting of a
Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis that the Interrogatories were not answered and/or for the Request for Production of Documents.
That the Plaintiff submitted to the Defendants some 63
Interrogatories, plus Request for Production of Documents
and that the Defendants had a very difficult time in attempting to obtain the information since they are voluminous.

Smith vs. Ba lelor, et al.
Civil No: 461^7

That the Answers

to the Request

for Production of

Documents and the Interrogatories have been answered and
were answered as of November 30th, and a Certificate filed
with the Davis County Clerk's Office on December 1, 1989.
That
missions

the Defendants
should

be

deemed

deny

the

admitted

allegations

that Ad-

in that there

is a

material issue of fact of law relative to this matter and
that the Defendants are entitled to their day in Court and
Plaintiff is attempting to obtain judgment without having
the matter heard or tried in Court, and that the Defendants
have legitimate defenses which should be heard by the Court.
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment be denied and that Defendants be allowed to
pursue their discovery, and for such other and further order
as the Court may deem appropriate.
DATED this

day of December, 1989.

Smith vs. Be lelor, et al.
Civil No: 46i^7

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

'

day of November,

1989, I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and
foregoing

OBJECTION

TO

MOTION

FOR

SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

by

placing same in the U.S. Mail postage prepaid and addressed
to the following:
Stephen R. Smith, Jr.
Plaintiff Pro Se
236 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

THE CODE OF THE LAWS
OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TITLE 29 — LABOR
CHAPTER 8. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS
[§§ 206-219 of 29 USCS, Chapter 8, are contained in this volume]
Section
201. Short title
202. Finding and declaration of policy
203. Definitions
204. Administrator
205. Special industry committees for Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands
206. Minimum wages
207. Maximum hours
208. Wage orders in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands
209. Attendance of witnesses
210. Court review
211. Investigation, inspections, record, and homework regulations
212. Child labor provisions
213. Exemptions
214. Learners, apprentices, students, and handicapped workers
215. Prohibited acts—Prima facie evidence
216. Penalties—Civil and criminal liability—Enforcement procedure—Savings provisions
216a. [Repealed]
216b. Liability for overtime work performed prior to July 20, 1949
217. Injunction proceedings
218. Relation to other laws
219. Separability of provisions

§ 206. Minimum wages
(a) Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who in any
workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
1

29 USCS § 206

LABOR

commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce, wages at the following rates:
(1) not less than $2 an hour during the period ending December 31,
1974, not less than $2.10 an hour during the year beginning January 1,
1975, and not less than $2.30 an hour after December 31, 1975, except
as otherwise provided in this section;
(2) if such employee is a home worker in Puerto Rico or the Virgin
Islands, not less than the minimum piece rate prescribed by regulation
or order; or, if no such minimum piece rate is in effect, any piece rate
adopted by such employer which shall yield, to the proportion or class
of employees prescribed by regulation or order, not less than the
applicable minimum hourly wage rate. Such minimum piece rates or
employer piece rates shall be commensurate with, and shall be paid in
lieu of, the minimum hourly wage rate applicable under the provisions
of this section. The Administrator, or his authorized representative, shall
have power to make such regulations or orders as are necessary or
appropriate to carry out any of the provisions of this paragraph,
including the power without limiting the generality of the foregoing, to
define any operation or occupation which is performed by such home
work employees in Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands; to establish
minimum piece rates for any operation or occupation so defined; to
prescribe the method and procedure for ascertaining and promulgating
minimum piece rates; to prescribe standards for employer piece rates,
including the proportion or class of employees who shall receive not less
than the minimum hourly wage rates; to define the term "home
worker"; and to prescribe the conditions under which employers, agents,
contractors, and subcontractors shall cause goods to be produced by
home workers;
(3) if such employee is employed in American Samoa, in lieu of the rate
or rates provided by this subsection or subsection (b), not less than the
applicable rate established by the Secretary of Labor in accordance with
recommendations of a special industry committee or committees which
he shall appoint in the same manner and pursuant to the same provisions as are applicable to the special industry committees provided for
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands by this Act [29 USCS §§ 201-216,
217-219, 557] as amended from time to time. Each such committee shall
have the same powers and duties and shall apply the same standards
with respect to the application of the provisions of this Act [29 USCS
§§201-216, 217-219, 557] to employees employed in American Samoa
as pertain to special industry committees established under section 5 [29
USCS § 205] with respect to employees employed in Puerto Rico or the
Virgin Islands. The minimum wage rate thus established shall not
exceed the rate prescribed in paragraph (1) of this subsection;
(4) if such employee is employed as a seaman on an American vessel,
not less than the rate which will provide to the employee, for the period
2
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covered by the wage payment, wages equal to compensation at th
hourly rate prescribed by paragraph (1) of this subsection for all hour
during such period when he was actually on duty (including period
aboard ship when the employee was on watch or was, at the direction c
a superior officer, performing work or standing by, but not including ofl
duty periods which are provided pursuant to the employment agree
ment); or
(5) if such employee is employed in agriculture, not less than—
(A) $1.60 an hour during the period ending December 31, 1974,
(B) $1.80 an hour during the year beginning January 1, 1975,
(C) $2 an hour during the year beginning January 1, 1976,
(D) $2.20 an hour during the year beginning January 1, 1977, and
(E) $2.30 an hour after December 31, 1977.
(b) Every employer shall pay to each of his employees (other than ai
employee to whom subsection (a)(5) applies) who in any workweek i,
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or i,
employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production o
goods for commerce, and who in such workweek is brought within th<
purview of this section by the amendments made to this Act by the FaL
Labor Standards Amendments of 1966 [29 USCS §§203, 206, 207, 213
214, 216, 218, 255], title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, or th<
Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, wages at the following rates:
(1) not less than $1.90 an hour during the period ending December 31
1974,
(2) not less than $2 an hour during the year beginning January 1, 1975,
(3) not less than $2.20 an hour during the year beginning January 1
1976, and
(4) not less than $2.30 an hour after December 31, 1976.
(c)(1) The rate or rates provided by subsections (a) and (b) of this section
shall be superseded in the case of any employee in Puerto Rico or the
Virgin Islands only for so long as and insofar as such employee is
covered by a wage order heretofore or hereafter issued by the Secretary
pursuant to the recommendations of a special industry committee
appointed pursuant to section 5 [29 USCS § 205].
(2) Except as provided in paragraphs (4) and (5), in the case of any
employee who is covered by such a wage order on the date of enactment
of the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974 and to whom the rate
or rates prescribed by subsection (a) or (b) would otherwise apply, the
wage rate applicable to such employee shall be increased as follows:
(A) Effective on the effective date of the Fair Labor Standards
Amendments of 1974 [May 1, 1974], the wage order rate applicable to
such employee on the day before such date shall—
(i) if such rate is under $1.40 an hour, be increased by $0.12 an
hour, and
3
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(ii) if such rate is $1.40 or more an hour, be increased by $0.15 an
hour.
(B) Effective on the first day of the second and each subsequent year
after such date, the highest wage order rate applicable to such
employees on the date before such first day shall—
(i) if such rate is under $1.40 an hour, be increased by $0.12 an
hour, and
(ii) if such rate is $1.40 or more an hour, be increased by $0.15 an
hour.
In the case of any employee employed in agriculture who is covered by
a wage order issued by the Secretary pursuant to the recommendations
of a special industry committee appointed pursuant to section 5 [29
USCS § 205], to whom the rate or rates prescribed by subsection (a)(5)
would otherwise apply, and whose hourly wage is increased above the
wage rate prescribed by such wage order by a subsidy (or income
supplement) paid, in whole or in part, by the government of Puerto
Rico, the increases prescribed by this paragraph shall be applied to the
sum of the wage rate in effect under such wage order and the amount by
which the employee's hourly wage rate is increased by the subsidy (or
income supplement) above the wage rate in effect under such wage
order.
(3) In the case of any employee employed in Puerto Rico or the Virgin
Islands to whom this section is made applicable by the amendments
made to this Act [29 USCS §§201-216, 217-219, 557] by the Fair
Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, the Secretary shall, as soon as
practicable after the date of enactment of the Fair Labor Standards
Amendments of 1974 [Apr. 8, 1974], appoint a special industry committee in accordance with section 5 [29 USCS § 205] to recommend the
highest minimum wage rate or rates, which shall be not less than 60 per
centum of the otherwise applicable minimum wage rate in effect under
subsection (b) or $1.00 an hour, whichever is greater, to be applicable to
such employee in lieu of the rate or rates prescribed by subsection (b).
The rate recommended by the special industry committee shall (A) be
effective with respect to such employee upon the effective date of the
wage order issued pursuant to such recommendation, but not before
sixty days after the effective date of the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974 [May 1, 1974], and (B) except in the case of employees of
the government of Puerto Rico or any political subdivision thereof, be
increased in accordance with paragraph (2)(B).
(4)(A) Notwithstanding paragraph (2)(A) or (3), the wage rate of any
employee in Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands which is subject to
paragraph (2)(A) or (3) of this subsection, shall, on the effective date
of the wage increase under paragraph (2)(A) or of the wage rate
recommended under paragraph (3), as the case may be, be not less
than 60 per centum of the otherwise applicable rate under subsection
(a) or (b) or $1.00, whichever is higher.
4
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(B) Notwithstanding paragraph (2)(B), the wage rate of any employ
in Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands which is subject to paragra]
(2)(B), shall, on and after the effective date of the first wage increa
under paragraph (2)(B), be not less than 60 per centum of tl
otherwise applicable rate under subsection (a) or (b) or $1.00, whic
ever is higher.
(5) If the wage rate of an employee is to be increased under tl
subsection to a wage rate which equals or is greater than the wage ra
under subsection (a) or (b) which, but for paragraph (1) of tfc
subsection, would be applicable to such employee, this subsection shi
be inapplicable to such employee and the applicable rate under su<
subsection shall apply to such employee.
(6) Each minimum wage rate prescribed by or under paragraph (2) <
(3) shall be in effect unless such minimum wage rate has been supe
seded by a wage order (issued by the Secretary pursuant to tl
recommendation of a special industry committee convened under sectk
8) fixing a higher minimum wage rate.
(d)(1) No employer having employees subject to any provisions of th
section shall discriminate, within any establishment in which sue
employees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex I
paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than tl
rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in sue
establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which requir
equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed und
similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursi
ant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system whic
measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv)
differential based on any other factor other than sex: Provided, That i
employer who is paying a wage rate differential in violation of th
subsection shall not, in order to comply with the provisions of th
subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee.
(2) No labor organization, or its agents, representing employees of i
employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section sha
cause or attempt to cause such an employer to discriminate against a
employee in violation of paragraph (1) of this subsection.
i^(3) For purposes of administration and enforcement, any amounts owir
to any employee which have been withheld in violation of this subse
tion shall be deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtin
compensation under this Act [29 USCS §§ 201-216, 217-219, 557].
(4) As used in this subsection, the term "labor organization" means ar
organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representatic
committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists ft
the purpose, in whole or in part, or dealing with employers concernir
grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, <
conditions of work.
5
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(e)(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 13 of this Act [29 USCS
§ 213] (except subsections (a)(1) and (f) thereof), every employer providing any contract services (other than linen supply services) under a
contract with the United States or any subcontract thereunder shall pay
to each of his employees whose rate of pay is not governed by the
Service Contract Act of 1965 (41 USC 351-357) [41 USCS §§ 351-357]
or to whom subsection (a)(1) of this section is not applicable, wages at
rates not less than the rates provided for in subsection (b) of this
section.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 13 of this Act [29 USCS
§ 213] (except subsections (a)(1) and (f) thereof) and the provisions of
the Service Contract Act of 1965 [41 USCS §§ 351-357], every employer
in an establishment providing linen supply services to the United States
under a contract with the United States or any subcontract thereunder
shall pay to each of his employees in such establishment wages at rates
not less than those prescribed in subsection (b), except that if more than
50 per centum of the gross annual dollar volume of sales made or
business done by such establishment is derived from providing such
linen supply services under any such contracts or subcontracts, such
employer shall pay to each of his employees in such establishment wages
at rates not less than those prescribed in subsection (a)(1) of this section.
(f) Any employee—
(1) who in any workweek is employed in domestic service in a household shall be paid wages at a rate not less than the wage rate in effect
under section 6(b) [subsec. (b) this section] unless such employee's
compensation for such service would not because of section 209(g) of the
Social Security Act [42 USCS § 409(g)] constitute wages for the purposes of title II of such Act [42 USCS §§ 401, 402-410, 411-418, 420423, 424a-426, 427-431], or
(2) who in any workweek—
(A) is employed in domestic service in one or more households, and
(B) is so employed for more than 8 hours in the aggregate, shall be
paid wages for such employment in such workweek at a rate not less
than the wage rate in effect under section 6(b) [subsec. (b) this
section].
(June 25, 1938, c. 676, § 6, 52 Stat. 1062; June 26, 1940, c. 432, § 3(e), (f),
54 Stat. 616; Oct. 26, 1949, c. 736, § 6, 63 Stat. 912; Aug. 12, 1955, c. 867,
§3, 69 Stat. 711; Aug. 8, 1956, c. 1035, §2, 70 Stat. 1118; May 5, 1961,
P.L. 87-30, § 5, 75 Stat. 67; June 10, 1963, P. L. 88-38, § 3, 77 Stat. 56;
Sept. 23, 1966, P. L. 89-601, Title III, §§ 301-305, 80 Stat. 838-841; Apr.
8, 1974, P. L. 93-259, §§ 2-4, 5(b), 7(b)(1), 88 Stat. 55, 56, 62.)
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
References in text:
"Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972", referred to in subsec
(b) of this section, is Act June 23, 1972, P. L. 92-318, Title IX, §§ 901907, 86 Stat. 373-375, and appears as 20 USCS §§ 1681, 1682, 1683,
6
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[Chapters 8, §§ 206-219, 9 and 10 are contained in this volume]
Chapter
Beginning Section
13. Exemplary Rehabilitation Certificates [Repealed]
601
17. Comprehensive Employment and Training Act [Repealed]
801
19. Job Training Partnership
1501
20. Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection
1801
21. Helen Keller National Center for Deaf-Blind Youths and Adults
1901
22. Employee Polygraph Protection
2001
23. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification
2101
24. Technology Related Assistance for Individuals With Disabilities
2201

§ 206. Minimum wages
(a) [Introductory material unchanged]
(1) not less than $2.65 an hour during the year beginning January 1, 1978, not less than
$2.90 an hour during the year beginning January 1, 1979, not less than $3.10 an hour
during the year beginning January 1, 1980, and not less than $3.35 an hour after
December 31, 1980, except as otherwise provided in this section;
(2H4) [Unchanged]
(5) if such employee is employed in agriculture, not less than the minimum wage rate in
effect under paragraph (1) after December 31, 1977.
(b) Every employer shall pay to each of his employees (other than an employee to whom
subsection (a)(5) applies) who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production
of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce, and who in such workweek is brought within the purview
of this section by the amendments made to this Act by the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966 [29 USCS §§ 203, 206, 207, 213, 214, 216, 218, 255], title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, or the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, wages at the
following rate: Effective after December 31, 1977, not less than the minimum wage rate in
effect under subsection (a)(1).
(c)(1) The rate or rates provided by subsection (a)(1) of this section shall be superseded in the
case of any employee in Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands only for so long as and insofar
as such employee is covered by a wage order (A) heretofore or hereafter issued by the
Secretary pursuant to the recommendations of a special industry committee appointed
pursuant to section 5 [29 USCS § 205], and (B) which prescribes a wage order rate which
is less than the wage rate in effect under subsection (a)(1).
(2)(A) Each wage order rate under a wage order described in paragraph (1) which on
December 31, 1977, is at least $2 an hour shall, except as provided in paragraph (3), be
increased—
(i) effective January 1, 1978, by $0.25 an hour or by such greater amount as may be
recommended by a special industry committee under section 8, and
(Vi) effective J^nuarv 1. 1979. and Jarmarv 1 of each succeedine vear. Hv SO.30 an
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hour or by such greater amount as may be so recommended by such a special
industry committee.
(B) Each wage order rate under a wage order described in paragraph (1) which on
December 31, 1977, is less than $2 an hour shall, except as provided in paragraph (3),
be increased—
(i) effective January 1, 1978, by $0.20 an hour or by such greater amount as may be
recommended by a special industry committee under section 8, and
(ii) effective January 1, 1979, and January 1 of each succeeding year—
(I) until such wage order rate is not less than $2.30 an hour, by $0.25 an hour or
by such greater amount as may be so recommended by a special industry
committee, and
(II) if such wage order rate is not less than $2.30 an hour, by $0.30 an hour or
by such greater amount as may be so recommended by a special industry
committee.
(C) In the case of any employee in agriculture who is covered by a wage order issued
by the Secretary pursuant to the recommendations of a special industry committee
appointed pursuant to section 5 [29 USCS § 205], to whom the rate or rates prescribed
by subsection (a)(5) of this section would otherwise apply, and whose hourly wage is
increased above the wage rate prescribed by such wage order by a subsidy (or income
supplement) paid, in whole or in part, by the government of Puerto Rico, the
applicable increases prescribed by subparagraph (A) or (B) shall be applied to the sum
of the wage rate in effect under such wage order and the amount by which the
employee's hourly wage is increased by the sub.-id\ voi income supplement) above the
wage rate in effect under such wage order.
(3) If the wage rate of an employee is to be increased under this subsection to a wage rate
which equals or is greater than the wage rate under subsection (a)(1) which, but for
paragraph (1) of this subsection, would be applicable to such employee, this subsection
shall be inapplicable to such employee and the applicable rate under subsection (a)(1) shall
apply to such employee.
(4) Each minimum wage rate prescribed by or under paragraph (2) shall be in effect unless
such minimum wage rate has been superseded by a wage order (issued by the Secretary
pursuant to the recommendation of a special industry committee convened under section
8) fixing a higher minimum wage rate.
( d H O [Unchanged]
(As amended Nov. 1, 1977, P. L. 95-151, § 2(a)-(c), (d)(1), (2), 91 Stat. 1245.)
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
Amendments:
1977. Act Nov. 1, 1977, in subsec. (a), substituted para. (1) for one that read: "(1) not less
than $2 an hour during the period ending December 31, 1974, not less than $2.10 an hour
during the year beginning January 1, 1975, and not less than $2.30 an hour after December
31, 1975, except as otherwise provided in this section;" and substituted para. (5) for one
that read: "(5) if such employee is employed in agriculture, not less than—
"(A) $1.60 an hour during the period ending December 31, 1974,
"(B) $1.80 an hour during the year beginning January 1, 1975,
"(C) $2 an hour during the year beginning January 1, 1976,
"(D) $2.20 an hour during the year beginning January 1, 1977, and
"(E) $2.30 an hour after December 31, 1977.";
In subsec. (b), such Act substituted "rate:" for "rates:", substituted "Effective after Dec.
31, 1977, not less than the minimum wage rate in effect under subsec. (a)(1)." for paras.
(l)-(4), which read:
In the case of any employee employed in agriculture who is covered by a wage order issued
by the Secretary pursuant to the recommendations of a special industry committee
appointed pursuant to section 5, to whom the rate or rates prescribed by subsection (a)(5)
would otherwise apply, and whose hourly wage is increased above the wage rate prescribed
by such wage order by a subsidy (or income supplement) paid, in whole or in part, by the
government of Puerto Rico, the increases prescribed by this paragraph shall be applied to
the sum of the wage rate in effect under such wage order and the amount by which the
employee's hourly wage rate is increased by the subsidy (or income supplement) above the
wage rate in effect under such wage order.
"(1) not less than $1.90 an hour during the period ending December 31, 1974,
"(2) not less than $2 an hour during the year beginning January 1, 1975,
"(3) not less than $2.20 an hour during the year beginning January 1, 1976, and
"(4) not less than $2.30 an hour after December 31, 1976.";
In subsec. (c), in para. (1), substituted "subsection (a)(1)" for "subsections (a) and (b)'\
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inserted "(A)", and inserted , and (B) which prescribes a wage order rate which is less
than the wage rate in effect under subsection (a)(1)", substituted para (2) for former paras
(2)-(4) which read
"(2) Except as provided in paragraphs (4) and (5), in the case of any employee who is
covered by such a wage order on the date of enactment of the Fair Labor Standards
Amendments of 1974 and to whom the rate or rates prescribed by subsection (a) or (b)
would otherwise apply, the wage rate applicable to such employee shall be increased as
follows
"(A) Effective on the effective date of the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of
1974, the wage order rate applicable to such employee on the day before such date
shall—
"(l) if such rate is under $1 40 an hour, be increased by $0 12 an hour, and
"(n) if such rate is $1 40 or more an hour, be increased by $0 15 an hour
"(B) Effective on the first day of the second and each subsequent year after such
date, the highest wage order rate applicable to such employees on the date before
such first day shall—
"(l) if such rate is under $1 40 an hour, be increased by $0 12 an hour, and
"(n) if such rate is $1 40 or more an hour, be increased by $0 15 an hour
"(3) In the case of any employee employed in Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands to
whom this section is made applicable by the amendments made to this Act by the Fair
Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, the Secretary shall, as soon as practicable after
the date of enactment of the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, appoint a
special industry committee in accordance with section 5 to recommend the highest
minimum wage rate or rates, which shall be not less than 60 per centum of the
otherwise applicable minimum wage rate in effect under subsection (b) or $1 00 an
hour, whichever is greater, to be applicable to such employee in lieu of the rate or rates
prescribed by subsection (b) The rate recommended by the special industry committee
shall (A) be effective with respect to such employee upon the effective date of the wage
order issued pursuant to such recommendation, but not before sixty days after the
effective date of the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, and (B) except in the
case of employees of the government of Puerto Rico or any political subdivision
thereof, be increased in accordance with paragraph (2)(B)
"(4)(A) Notwithstanding paragraph (2)(A) or (3), the wage rate of any employee in
Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands which is subject to paragraph (2)(A) or (3) of this
subsection, shall, on the effective date of the wage increase under paragraph (2)(A)
or of the wage rate recommended under paragraph (3), as the case may be, be not
less than 60 per centum of the otherwise applicable rate under subsection (a) or (b)
or $1 00, whichever is higher
"(B) Notwithstanding paragraph (2)(B), the wage rate of anv employee m Puerto
Rico or the Virgin Islands which is subject to paragraph (2)(B), shall, on and after
the effective date of the first wage increase under paragraph (2)(B), be not less than
60 per centum of the otherwise applicable rate under subsection (a) or (b) or $1 00,
whichever is higher "
Such Act, in subsec (c), redesignated former paras (5) and (6) as paras (3) and (4),
respectively, m para (3), as redesignated, substituted "subsection (a)(1)" the first time it
appears for "subsection (a) or (b)", and the second time it appears, for "such subsection,
and in para (4), as redesignated, deleted "or (3)" following "paragraph (2)"
Transfer of functions:
Section 1 of 1978 Reorg Plan No 1 of Feb 23, 1978, 43 Fed Reg 19807, provided
"Transfer of Equal Pay Enforcement Functions
"All functions related to enforcing or administering Section 6(d) of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, as amended, (29 U S C 206(d) [this section]) are hereby transferred to the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Such functions include, but shall not be
limited to, the functions relating to equal pay administration and enforcement now vested
in the Secretary of Labor, the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the
Department of Labor, and the Civil Service Commission pursuant to Sections 4(d)(1), 4(f),
9, 11(a), (b), and (c), 16(b) and (c) and 17 of the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended,
(29 U S C 204(d)(1), 204(0, 209, 211(a), (b), and (c), 216(b) and (c) and 217 [29 USCS
§§ 204(d)(1), (0, 209, 211(aMc), 216(b), (c), 217]) and Section 10(b)(1) of the Portal-toPortal Act of 1947, as amended, (29 U S C 259 [29 USCS § 259(b)(1)]) "

CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
Add
29 CFR Parts 601-730, 778, 1620
Delete
29 CFR Parts 512, 601-657, 661-729, 800
RESEARCH GUIDE

§ 207. Maximum hours
(a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, no employer shall
employ any of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed
in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce, for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours
above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular
rate at which he is employed.
(2) No employer shall employ any of his employees who in any
workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in
the production of goods for commerce, and who in such workweek is
brought within the purview of this subsection by the amendments made
to this Act [29 USCS §§ 201-216, 217-219] by the Fair Labor Standards
Amendments of 1966 [29 USCS §§ 203, 206, 207, 213, 214, 216, 218]—
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(A) for a workweek longer than forty-four hours during the first year
from the effective date of the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of
1966 [Feb. 1, 1967],
(B) for a workweek longer than forty-two hours during the second
year from such date, or
(C) for a workweek longer than forty hours after the expiration of the
second year from such date,
unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in
excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and onehalf times the regular rate at which he is employed.
(b) No employer shall be deemed to have violated subsection (a) by
employing any employee for a workweek in excess of that specified in such
subsection without paying the compensation for overtime employment
prescribed therein if such employee is so employed—
(1) in pursuance of an agreement, made as a result of collective
bargaining by representatives of employees certified as bona fide by the
National Labor Relations Board, which provides that no employee shall
be employed more than one thousand and forty hours during any period
of twenty-six consecutive weeks; or
(2) in pursuance of an agreement, made as a result of collective
bargaining by representatives of employees certified as bona fide by the
National Labor Relations Board, which provides that during a specified
period of fifty-two consecutive weeks the employee shall be employed
not more than two thousand two hundred and forty hours and shall be
guaranteed not less than one thousand eight hundred and forty hours
(or not less than forty-six weeks at the normal number of hours worked
per week, but not less than thirty hours per week) and not more than
two thousand and eighty hours of employment for which he shall
receive compensation for all hours guaranteed or worked at rates not
less than those applicable under the agreement to the work performed
and for all hours in excess of the guaranty which are also in excess of
the maximum workweek applicable to such employee under subsection
(a) or two thousand and eighty in such period at rates not less than one
and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed; or
(3) by an independently owned and controlled local enterprise (including
an enterprise with more than one bulk storage establishment) engaged in
the wholesale or bulk distribution of petroleum products if—
(A) the annual gross volume of sales of such enterprise is less than
$1,000,000 exclusive of excise taxes,
(B) more than 75 per centum of such enterprise's annual dollar
volume of sales is made within the State in which such enterprise is
located, and
(C) not more than 25 per centum of the annual dollar volume of sales
of such enterprise is to customers who are engaged in the bulk
distribution of such products for resale, and such employee receives
42
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compensation for employment in excess of forty hours in any workweek at a rate not less than one and one-half times the minimum
wage rate applicable to him under section 6 [29 USCS § 206], and if
such employee receives compensation for employment in excess of
twelve hours in any workday, or for employment in excess of fifty-six
hours in any workweek, as the case may be, at a rate not less than
one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.
(c) For a period or periods of not more than five workweeks in the
aggregate in any calendar year, or seven workweeks in the aggregate in the
case of an employer who dees not qualify for the exemption in subsection
(d) of this section, any employer may employ any employee for a workweek in excess of that specified in subsection (a) without paying the
compensation for overtime employment prescribed in such subsection if
such employee (1) is employed by such employer in an industry found by
the Secretary to be of a seasonal nature, and (2) receives compensation for
employment by such employer in excess of ten hours in any workday, or
for employment by such employer in excess of forty-eight hours in any
workweek, as the case may be, at a rate not less than one and one-half
times the regular rate at which he is employed.
(d) For a period or periods of not more than five workweeks in the
aggregate in any calendar year, or seven workweeks in the aggregate in the
case of an employer who does not qualify for the exemption in subsection
(c) of this section, any employer may employ any employee for a workweek in excess of that specified in subsection (a) without paying the
compensation for overtime employment prescribed in such subsection, if
such employee—
(1) is employed by such employer in an enterprise which is in an
industry found by the Secretary—
(A) to be characterized by marked annually recurring seasonal peaks
of operation at the places of first marketing or first processing of
agricultural or horticultural commodities from farms if such industry
is engaged in the handling, packing, preparing, storing, first processing, or canning of any perishable agricultural or horticultural commodities in their raw or natural state, or
(B) to be of a seasonal nature and engaged in the handling, packing,
storing, preparing, first processing, or canning of any perishable
agricultural or horticultural commodities in their raw or natural state,
and
(2) receives compensation for employment by such employer in excess of
ten hours in any workday, or for employment in excess of forty-eight
hours in any workweek, as the case may be, at a rate not less than one
and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.
(e) As used in this section the "regular rate" at which an employee is
employed shall be deemed to include all remuneration for employment
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paid to, or on behalf of, the employee, but shall not be deemed to
include—
(1) sums paid as gifts; payments in the nature of gifts made at Christmas
time or on other special occasions, as a reward for service, the amounts
of which are not measured by or dependent on hours worked, production, or efficiency;
(2) payments made for occasional periods when no work is performed
due to vacation, holiday, illness, failure of the employer to provide
sufficient work, or other similar cause; reasonable payments for traveling
expenses, or other expenses, incurred by an employee in the furtherance
of his employer's interests and properly reimbursable by the employer;
and other similar payments to an employee which are not made as
compensation for his hours of employment;
(3) Sums paid in recognition of services performed during a given period
if either, (a) both the fact that payment is to be made and the amount of
the payment are determined at the sole discretion of the employer at or
near the end of the period and not pursuant to any prior contract,
agreement, or promise causing the employee to expect such payments
regularly; or (b) the payments are made pursuant to a bona fide profitsharing plan or trust or bona fide thrift or savings plan, meeting the
requirements of the Administrator set forth in appropriate regulations
which he shall issue, having due regard among other relevant factors, to
the extent to which the amounts paid to the employee are determined
without regard to hours of work, production, or efficiency; or (c) the
payments are talent fees (as such talent fees are defined and delimited by
regulations of the Administrator) paid to performers, including announcers, on radio and television programs;
(4) contributions irrevocably made by an employer to a trustee or third
person pursuant to a bona fide plan for providing old-age, retirement,
life, accident, or health insurance or similar benefits for employees;
(5) extra compensation provided by a premium rate paid for certain
hours worked by the employee in any day or workweek because such
hours are hours worked in excess of eight in a day or in excess of the
maximum workweek applicable to such employee under subsection (a)
or in excess of the employee's normal working hours or regular working
hours, as the case may be;
(6) extra compensation provided by a premium rate paid for work by
the employee on Saturdays, Sundays, holidays, or regular days of rest,
or on the sixth or seventh day of the workweek, where such premium
rate is not less than one and one-half times the rate established in good
faith for like work performed in nonovertime hours on other days; or
(7) extra compensation provided by a premium rate paid to the employee, in pursuance of an applicable employment contract or collectivebargaining agreement, for work outside of the hours established in good
faith by the contract or agreement as the basic, normal, or regular
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workday (not exceeding eight hours) or workweek (not exceeding the
maximum workweek applicable to such employee under subsection (a)
[2], where such premium rate is not less than one and one-half times the
rate established in good faith by the contract or agreement for like work
performed during such workday or workweek.
(f) No employer shall be deemed to have violated subsection (a) by
employing any employee for a workweek in excess of the maximum
workweek applicable to such employee under subsection (a) if such
employee is employed pursuant to a bona fide individual contract, or
pursuant to an agreement made as a result of collective bargaining by
representatives of employees, if the duties of such employee necessitate
irregular hours of work, and the contract or agreement (1) specifies a
regular rate of pay of not less than the minimum hourly rate provided in
subsection (a) or (b) of section 6 [29 USCS § 206(a) or (b)] (whichever may
be applicable) and compensation at not less than one and one-half times
such rate for all hours worked in excess of such maximum workweek, and
(2) provides a weekly guaranty of pay for not more than sixty hours based
on the rates so specified.
(g) No employer shall be deemed to have violated subsection (a) by
employing any employee for a workweek in excess of the maximum
workweek applicable to such employee under such subsection if, pursuant
to an agreement or understanding arrived at between the employer and the
employee before performance of the work, the amount paid to the employee for the number of hours worked by him in such workweek in excess
of the maximum workweek applicable to such employee under such
subsection—
(1) in the case of an employee employed at piece rates, is computed at
piece rates not less than one and one-half times the bona fide piece rates
applicable to the same work when performed during nonovertime hours;
or
(2) in the case of an employee performing two or more kinds of work
for which different hourly or piece rates have been established, is
computed at rates not less than one and one-half times such bona fide
rates applicable to the same work when performed during non-overtime
hours; or
(3) is computed at a rate not less than one and one-half times the rate
established by such agreement or understanding as the basic rate to be
used in computing overtime compensation thereunder: Provided, That
the rate so established shall be authorized by regulation by the Administrator as being substantially equivalent to the average hourly earnings of
the employee, exclusive of overtime premiums, in the particular work
over a representative period of time; and if (i) the employee's average
hourly earnings for the workweek exclusive of payments described in
paragraphs (1) through (7) of subsection (e) are not less than the
minimum hourly rate required by applicable law, and (ii) extra overtime
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compensation is properly computed and paid on other forms of additional pay required to be included in computing the regular rate.
(h) Extra compensation paid as described in paragraphs (5), (6), and (7) of
subsection (e) shall be creditable toward overtime compensation payable
pursuant to this section.
(i) No employer shall be deemed to have violated subsection (a) by
employing any employee at a retail or service establishment for a workweek in excess of the applicable workweek specified therein, if (1) the
regular rate of pay of such employee is in excess of one and one-half times
the minimum hourly rate applicable to him under section 6 [29 USCS
§ 206], and (2) more than half his compensation for a representative period
(not less than one month) represents commissions on goods or services. In
determining the proportion of compensation representing commissions, all
earnings resulting from the application of a bona fide commission rate shall
be deemed commissions on goods or services without regard to whether the
computed commissions exceed the draw or guarantee.
(j) No employer engaged in the operation of a hospital or an establishment
which is an institution primarily engaged in the care of the sick, the aged,
or the mentally ill or defective who reside on the premises shall be deemed
to have violated subsection (a) if, pursuant to an agreement or understanding arrived at between the employer and the employee before performance
of the work, a work period of fourteen consecutive days is accepted in lieu
of the workweek of seven consecutive days for purposes of overtime
computation and if, for his employment in excess of eight hours in any
workday and in excess of eighty hours in such fourteen-day period, the
employee receives period, the employee receives compensation at a rate not
less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.
(k) No public agency shall be deemed to have violated subsection (a) with
respect to the employment of any employee in fire protection activities or
any employee in law enforcement activities (including security personnel in
correctional institutions) if—
(1) in a work period of 28 consecutive days the employee receives for
tours of duty which in the aggregate exceed 240 hours; or
(2) in the case of such an employee to whom a work period of at least 7
but less than 28 days applies, in his work period the employee receives
for tours of duty which in the aggregate exceed a number of hours
which bears the same ratio to the number of consecutive days in his
work period as 240 hours bears to 28 days,
compensation at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular
rate at which he is employed.
(1) No employer shall employ any employee in domestic service in one or
more households for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such
employee receives compensation for such employment in accordance with
subsection (a).
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(m) For a period or periods of not more than fourteen workweeks in the
aggregate in any calendar year, any employer may employ any employee
for a workweek in excess of that specified in subsection (a) without paying
the compensation for overtime employment prescribed in such subsection,
if such employee—
(1) is employed by such employer—•
(A) to provide services (including stripping and grading) necessary
and incidental to the sale at auction of green leaf tobacco of type 11,
12, 13, 14, 21, 22, 23, 24, 31, 35, 36, or 37 (as such types are defined
by the Secretary of Agriculture [see 30 CFR § 30.1 et seq.]), or in
auction sale, buying, handling, stemming, redrying, packing, and
storing of such tobacco,
(B) in auction sale, buying, handling, sorting, grading, packing, or
storing green leaf tobacco of type 32 (as such type is defined by the
Secretary of Agriculture [see 30 CFR § 30.1 et seq.]), or
(C) in auction sale, buying, handling, stripping, sorting, grading,
sizing, packing, or stemming prior to packing, of perishable cigar leaf
tobacco of type 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 61, or 62 (as
such types are defined by the Secretary of Agriculture [see 30 CFR
§ 30.1 et seq.]); and
(2) receives for—
(A) such employment by such employer which is in excess of ten
hours in any workday, and
(B) such employment by such employer which is in excess of fortyeight hours in any workweek,
compensation at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular
rate at which he is employed.
An employer who receives an exemption under this subsection shall not be
eligible for any other exemption under this section.
(n) In the case of an employee of an employer engaged in the business of
operating a street, suburban or interurban electric railway, or local trolley
or motorbus carrier (regardless of whether or not such railway or carrier is
public or private or operated for profit or not for profit), in determining
the hours of employment of such an employee to which the rate prescribed
by subsection (a) applies there shall be excluded the hours such employee
was employed in charter activities by such employer if (1) the employee's
employment in such activities was pursuant to an_agreement or understanding with his employer arrived at before engaging in such employment,
and (2) if employment in such activities is not part of such employee's
regular employment.
(June 25, 1938, c. 676, § 7, 52 Stat. 1063; Oct. 29, 1941, c. 461, 55 Stat.
756; July 20, 1949, c. 352, § 1, 63 Stat. 446; Oct. 26, 1949, c. 736, §§ 7,
16(f), 63 Stat. 912, 920; May 5, 1961, P. L. 87-30, § 6, 75 Stat. 69; Sept.
23, 1966, P. L. 89-601, Title II, §§ 204(c), (d), 212(b), Title IV, §§ 40147

§ 207. Maximum hours
(aMb)(l), (2) [Unchanged]
(b)(3)(A), (B) [Unchanged]
(C) not more than 25 per centum of the annual dollar volume of sales of such
enterprise is to customers who are engaged in the bulk distribution of such products
for resale,
and such employee receives compensation for employment in excess of forty hours in any
work-week at a rate not less than one and one-half times the minimum wage rate
applicable to him under section 6 [29 USCS § 206],
and if such employee receives compensation for employment in excess of twelve hours in any
workday, or for employment in excess of fifty-six hours in any workweek, as the case may be,
at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.
(c) [Repealed]
(d) [Repealed]
(e), (0 [Unchanged]
(g)(1), (2) [Unchanged]
(3) is computed at a rate not less than one and one-half times the rate established by such
agreement or understanding as the basic rate to be used in computing overtime compensation thereunder:
Provided, That the rate so established shall be authorized by regulation by the Administrator
as being substantially equivalent to the average hourly earnings of the employee, exclusive of
overtime premiums, in the particular work over a representative period of time; and if (i) the
employee's average hourly earnings for the workweek exclusive of payments described in
paragraphs (1) through (7) of subsection (e) are not less than the minimum hourly rate
required by applicable law, and (ii) extra overtime compensation is properly computed and
paid on other forms of additional pay required to be included in computing the regular rate,
(h), (i) [Unchanged]
(j) No employer engaged in the operation of a hospital or an establishment which is an
institution primarily engaged in the care of the sick, the aged, or the mentally ill or defective
who reside on the premises shall be deemed to have violated subsection (a) if, pursuant to an
agreement or understanding arrived at between the employer and the employee before
performance of the work, a work period of fourteen consecutive days is accepted in lieu of
the workweek of seven consecutive days for purposes of overtime computation and if, for his
employment in excess of eight hours in any workday and in excess of eighty hours in such
fourteen-day period, the employee receives compensation at a rate not less than one and onehalf times the regular rate at which he is employed,
(k) No public agency shall be deemed to have violated subsection (a) with respect to the
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employment of any employee in fire protection activities or any employee in law enforcement
activities (including security personnel in correctional institutions) if—
(1) in a work period of 28 consecutive days the employee receives for tours of duty which
in the aggregate exceed the lesser of (A) 216 hours, or (B) the average number of hours
(as determined by the Secretary pursuant to section 6(c)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards
Amendments of 1974) [29 USCS §213 note] in tours of duty of employees engaged in
such activities in work periods of 28 consecutive days in calendar year 1975; or
(2) in the case of such an employee to whom a work period of at least 7 but less than 28
days applies, in his work period the employee receives for tours of duty which in the
aggregate exceed a number of hours which bears the same ratio to the number of
consecutive days in his work period as 216 hours (or if lower, the number of hours
referred to in clause (B) of paragraph (1)) bears to 28 days,
compensation at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is
employed.
flMn) [Unchanged]
(o)(l) Employees of a public agency which is a State, a political subdivision of a State, or an
interstate governmental agency may receive, in accordance with this subsection and in lieu
of overtime compensation, compensatory time off at a rate not less than one and one-half
hours for each hour of employment for which overtime compensation is required by this
section.
(2) A public agency may provide compensatory time under paragraph (1) only—
(A) pursuant to—
(i) applicable provisions of a collective bargaining agreement, memorandum of
understanding, or any other agreement between the public agency and representatives of such employees; or
(ii) in the case of employees not covered by subclause (i), an agreement or
understanding arrived at between the employer and employee before the performance of the work; and
(B) if the employee has not accrued compensatory time in excess of the limit applicable
to the employee prescribed by paragraph (3).
In the case of employees described in clause (A)(ii) hired prior to April 15, 1986, the
regular practice in effect on April 15, 1986, with respect to compensatory time off for such
employees in lieu of the receipt of overtime compensation, shall constitute an agreement
or understanding under such clause (A)(ii). Except as provided in the previous sentence,
the provision of compensatory time off to such employees for hours worked after April 14,
1986, shall be in accordance with this subsection.
(3)(A) If the work of an employee for which compensatory time may be provided included
work in a public safety activity, an emergency response activity, or a seasonal activity,
the employee engaged in such work may accrue not more than 480 hours of
compensatory time for hours worked after April 15, 1986. If such work was any other
work, the employee engaged in such work may accrue not more than 240 hours of
compensatory time for hours worked after April 15, 1986. Any such employee who,
after April 15, 1986, has accrued 480 or 240 hours, as the case may be, of compensatory time off shall, for additional overtime hours of work, be paid overtime compensation.
(B) If compensation is paid to an employee for accrued compensatory time off, such
compensation shall be paid at the regular rate earned by the employee at the time the
employee receives such payment.
(4) An employee who has accrued compensatory time off authorized to be provided under
paragraph (1) shall, upon termination of employment, be paid for the unused compensatory time at a rate of compensation not less than—
(A) the average regular rate received by such employee during the last 3 years of the
employee's employment, or
(B) the final regular rate received by such employee, whichever is higher
(5) An employee of a public agency which is a State, political subdivision of a State, or an
interstate governmental agency—
(A) who has accrued compensatory time off authorized to be provided under paragraph
(1), and
(B) who has requested the use of such compensatory time, shall be permitted by the
employee's employer to use such time within a reasonable period after making the
request if the use of the compensator} time does not unduly disrupt the operations of
the public agency.
(6) For purposes of this subsection—
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(A) the term "overtime compensation" means the compensation required by subsection
(a), and
(B) the terms "compensatory time" and "compensatory time off' mean hours during
which an employee is not working, which are not counted as hours worked during the
applicable workweek or other work period for purposes of overtime compensation, and
for which the employee is compensated at the employee's regular rate.
(p)(l) If an individual who is employed by a State, political subdivision of a State, or an
interstate governmental agency in fire protection or law enforcement activities (including
activities of security personnel in correctional institutions) and who, solely at such
individual's option, agrees to be employed on a special detail by a separate or independent
employer in fire protection, law enforcement, or related activities, the hours such
individual was employed by such separate and independent employer shall be excluded by
the public agency employing such individual in the calculation of the hours for which the
employee is entitled to overtime compensation under this section if the public agency—
(A) requires that its employees engaged in fire protection, law enforcement, or security
activities be hired by a separate and independent employer to perform the special
detail,
(B) facilitates the employment of such employees by a separate and independent
employer, or
(C) otherwise affects the condition of employment of such employees by a separate and
independent employer.
(2) If an employee of a public agency which is a State, political subdivision of a State, or
an interstate governmental agency undertakes, on an occasional or sporadic basis and
solely at the employee's- option, part-time employment for the public agency which is in a
different capacity from any capacity in which the employee is regularly employed with the
public agency, the hours such employee was employed in performing the different
employment shall be excluded by the public agency in the calculation of the hours for
which the employee is entitled to overtime compensation under this section.
(3) If an individual who is employed in any capacity by a public agency which is a State,
political subdivision of a State, or an interstate governmental agency, agrees, with the
approval of the public agency and solely at the option of such individual, to substitute
during scheduled work hours for another individual who is employed by such agency in
the same capacity, the hours such employee worked as a substitute shall be excluded by
the public agency in the calculation of the hours for which the employee is entitled to
overtime compensation under this section.
(As amended Apr. 8, 1974, P. L. 93-259, §§ 6(c)(1)(B), (C), (D), 19(d), (e), 88 Stat. 60, 66;
Nov. 13, 1985, P. L. 99-150, §§ 2(a), 3(a), (b), (c)(1), 99 Stat. 787, 789.)
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
Amendments:
1974. Act Apr. 8, 1974, in subsecs. (c) and (d), substituted, effective Jan. 1, 1976, "three
workweeks" for "five workweeks" and "five workweeks" for "seven workweeks"; and
in subsec. (k), effective Jan. 1, 1976, substituted "232 hours" for "240 hours" each place it
occurs.
Effective Dec. 31, 1976, subsecs. (c) and (d) are repealed; and effective Jan. 1, 1977, in
subsec. (k) substituted "216 hours" for "232 hours".
Effective January 1, 1978, in subsec. (k), substituted in paragraph (1) "exceed the lesser of
(A) 216 hours, or (B) the average number of hours (as determined by, the Secretary
pursuant to section 6(c)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974) in tours of
duty of employees engaged in such activities in work periods of 28 consecutive days in
calendar year 1975" for "exceed 216 hours", and in paragraph (2) "as 216 hours (or if
lower, the number of hours referred to in clause (B) of paragraph (1)) bears to 28 days"
for "as 216 hours bears to 28 days".
1985. Act Nov. 13, 1985 (effective 4/15/86, as provided by § 6 of such act, which appears
as 29 USCS § 203 note), added subsecs. (o) and (p).
Effective dates:
Section 19(d) of Act Apr. 8, 1974, provided that the substitution, in subsecs. (c) and (d), of
"three workweeks" for "five workweeks" and "five workweeks" for "seven workweeks"
should be effective Jan. 1, 1976.
Section 6(c)(1)(B) of Act Apr. 8, 1974, provided that the substitution, in subsec.(k), of
"232 hours" for "240 hours" each place it occurs should be effective Jan. 1, 1976.
Act Apr. 8, 1974, P. L. 93-259, § 19(e), 88 Stat. 66, provided: "(e) Effective December 31,
1976, sections 7(c) and 7(d) are repealed."
Act Apr. 8, 1974, P. L. 93-259, § 6(c)(1)(C), 88 Stat. 60, provided: "(Q Effective January
1, 1977, subsection (k) is amended by striking out "232 hours" each place it occurs and
inserting in lieu thereof "216 hours".
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§ 216. Penalties—Civil and criminal liability—Enforcement procedure—Savings provision
(a) Any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of section 15
[29 USCS § 215] shall upon conviction thereof be subject to a fine of not
more than $10,000, or to imprisonment for not more than six months, or
both. No person shall be imprisoned under this subsection except for an
offense committed after the conviction of such person for a prior offense
under this subsection.
(b) Any employer who violates the provisions of section 6 or section 7 of
this Act [29 USCS §§206 or 207] shall be liable to the employee or
employees aflfected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their
unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional
equal amount as liquidated damages. Action to recover such liability may
be maintained against any employer (including a public agency) in any
Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more
employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees
similarly situated. No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action
unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such
consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought. The court in
such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or
plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and
costs of the action. The right provided by this subsection to bring an action
by or on behalf of any employee, and the right of any employee to become
a party plaintiff to any such action, shall terminate upon the filing of a
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complaint by the Secretary of Labor in an action under section 17 [29
USCS §217] in which restraint is sought of any further delay in the
payment of unpaid minimum wages, or the amount of unpaid overtime
compensation, as the case may be, owing to such employee under section 6
or section 7 of this Act [29 USCS §§ 206 or 207] by an employer liable
therefor under the provisions of this subsection.
(c) The Secretary is authorized to supervise the payment of the unpaid
minimum wages or the unpaid overtime compensation owing to any
employee or employees under section 6 or 7 of this Act [29 USCS § 206 or
207], and the agreement of any employee to accept such payment shall
upon payment in full constitute a waiver by such employee of any right he
may have under subsection (b) of this section to such unpaid minimum
wages or unpaid overtime compensation and an additional equal amount as
liquidated damages. The Secretary may bring an action in any court of
competent jurisdiction to recover the amount of the unpaid minimum
wages or overtime compensation and an equal amount as liquidated
damages. The right provided by subsection (b) to bring an action by or on
behalf of any employee and of any employee to become a party plaintiff to
any such action shall terminate upon the filing of a complaint by the
Secretary in an action under this subsection in which a recovery is sought
of unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation under sections 6 and 7 [29 USCS §§ 206 and 207] or liquidated or other damages
provided by this subsection owing to such employee by an employer liable
under the provisions of subsection (b), unless such action is dismissed
without prejudice on motion of the Secretary. Any sums thus recovered by
the Administrator [Secretary of Labor] on behalf of an employee pursuant
to this subsection shall be held in a special deposit account and shall be
paid, on order of the Administrator [Secretary of Labor], directly to the
employee or employees affected. Any such sums not paid to an employee
because of inability to do so within a period of three years shall be covered
into the Treasury of the United States as miscellaneous receipts. In
determining when an action is commenced by the Administrator [Secretary
of Labor] under this subsection for the purposes of the statutes of
limitations provided in section 6(a) of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 [29
USCS § 255(a)], it shall be considered to be commenced in the case of any
individual claimant on the date when the complaint is filed if he is
specifically named as a party plaintiff in the complaint, or if his name did
not so appear, on the subsequent date on which his name is added as a
party plaintiff in such action.
(d) In any action or proceeding commenced prior to, on, or after the date
of enactment of this subsection [Aug. 8, 1956], no employer shall be
subject to any liability or punishment under this Act [29 USCS §§ 201216, 217-219] or the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 [this section, 29 USCS
§§251-262] on account of his failure to comply with any provision or
provisions of such Acts (1) with respect to work heretofore or hereafter
performed in a workplace to which the exemption in section 13(f) [29
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USCS § 213(f)] is applicable, (2) with respect to work performed in Guam,
the Canal Zone or Wake Island before the effective date of this amendment
of subsection (d) [expiration of 90 days from Aug. 30, 1957], or (3) with
respect to work performed in a possession named in section 6(a)(3) [29
USCS § 206(a)(3)] at any time prior to the establishment by the Secretary,
as provided therein, of a minimum wage rate applicable to such work.
(e) Any person who violates the provisions of section 12 [29 USCS § 212],
relating to child labor, or any regulation issued under that section, shall be
subject to a civil penalty of not to exceed $1,000 for each such violation. In
determining the amount of such penalty, the appropriateness of such
penalty to the size of the business of the person charged and the gravity of
the violation shall be considered. The amount of such penalty, when finally
determined, may be—
(1) deducted from any sums owing by the United States to the person
charged;
(2) recovered in a civil action brought by the Secretary in any court of
competent jurisdiction, in which litigation the Secretary shall be represented by the Solicitor of Labor; or
(3) ordered by the court, in an action brought for a violation of section
15(a)(4) [29 USCS § 215(a)(4)], to be paid to the Secretary.
Any administrative determination by the Secretary of the amount of such
penalty shall be final, unless within fifteen days after receipt of notice
thereof by certified mail the person charged with the violation takes
exception to the determination that the violations for which the penalty is
imposed occurred, in which event final determination of the penalty shall
be made in an administrative proceeding after opportunity for hearing in
accordance with section 554 of title 5, United States Code, and regulations
to be promulgated by the Secretary. Sums collected as penalties pursuant
to this section shall be applied toward reimbursement of the costs of
determining the violations and assessing and collecting such penalties, in
accordance with the provisions of section 2 of an Act entitled "An Act to
authorize the Department of Labor to make special statistical studies upon
payment of the cost thereof, and for other purposes" (29 U.S.C.9a).
(June 25, 1938, c. 676, § 16, 52 Stat. 1069; May 14, 1947, c. 52, Part IV,
§ 5(a), 61 Stat. 87; Oct. 26, 1949, c. 736, § 14, 63 Stat. 919; Aug. 8, 1956,
c. 1035, §4, 70 Stat. 1118; Aug. 30, 1957, P. L. 85-231, § 1(2), 71 Stat
514; May 5, 1961, P. L. 87-30, § 12(a), 75 Stat. 74; Sept. 23, 1966, P. L.
89-601, Title VI, § 601(a), 80 Stat. 844; Apr. 8, 1974, P. L. 93-259,
§§ 6(d)(1), 25(c), 26, 88 Stat. 61, 72, 73.)
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
Explanatory notes:
Bracketed words "Secretary of Labor" are inserted on authority of
1950 Reorg. Plan No. 6, set out as transfer of functions note to 29
USCS § 1.
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§ 216. Penalties—Civil and criminal liability—Enforcement procedure—Savings provisions
(a) [Unchanged]
(b) Any employer who violates the provisions of section 6 or section 7 of this Act [29 USCS
§§ 206 or 207] shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their
unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in
an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. Any employer who violates the provisions
of section 15(a)(3) of this Act [29 USCS § 215(a)(3)] shall be liable for such legal or equitable
relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of section 15(a)(3) [29 USCS
§ 215(a)(3)], including without limitation employment, reinstatement, promotion, and the
payment of wages lost and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. An action to
recover the liability prescribed in either of the preceding sentences may be maintained against
any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State court of competent
jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and
other employees similarly situated. No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action
unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the
court in which such action is brought. The court in such action shall, in addition to any
judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by
the defendant, and costs of the action. The right provided by this subsection to bring an
action by or on behalf of any employee, and the right of any employee to become a party
plaintiff to any such action, shall terminate upon the filing of a complaint by the Secretary of
Labor in an action under section 17 [29 USCS § 217] in which (1) restraint is sought of any
further delay in the payment of unpaid minimum wages, or the amount of unpaid overtime
compensation, as the case may be, owing to such employee under section 6 or section 7 of
this Act [29 USCS §§ 206 or 207] by an employer liable therefor under the provisions of this
subsection or (2) legal or equitable relief is sought as a result of alleged violations of section
15(a)(3) [29 USCS § 215(a)(3)].
(c) The Secretary is authorized to supervise the payment of the unpaid minimum wages or
the unpaid overtime compensation owing to any employee or employees under section 6 or 7
of this Act [29 USCS § 206 or 207], and the agreement of any employee to accept such
payment shall upon payment in full constitute a waiver by such employee of any right he
may have under subsection (b) of this section to such unpaid minimum wages or unpaid
overtime compensation and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. The Secretary
may bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction to recover the amount of the
unpaid minimum wages or overtime compensation and an equal amount as liquidated
damages. The right provided by subsection (b) to bring to recover the liability specified in the
first sentence of such subsection and of any employee to become a party plaintiff to any such
action shall terminate upon the filing of a complaint by the Secretary in an action under this
subsection in which a recovery is sought of unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime
compensation under sections 6 and 7 [29 USCS §§ 206 and 207] or liquidated or other
damages provided by this subsection owing to such employee by an employer liable under the
provisions of subsection (b), unless such action is dismissed without prejudice on motion of
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the Secretary. Any sums thus recovered by the Administrator [Secretary of Labor] on behalf
of an employee pursuant to this subsection shall be held in a special deposit account and
shall be paid, on order of the Administrator [Secretary of Labor], directly to the employee or
employees affected. Any such sums not paid to an employee because of inability to do so
within a period of three years shall be covered into the Treasury of the United States as
miscellaneous receipts. In determining when an action is commenced by the Administrator
[Secretary of Labor] under this subsection for the purposes of the statutes of limitations
provided in section 6(a) of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 [29 USCS § 255(a)], it shall be
considered to be commenced in the case of any individual claimant on the date when the
complaint is filed if he is specifically named as a party plaintiff in the complaint, or if his
name did not so appear, on the subsequent date on which his name is added as a party
plaintiff in such action,
(d), (e) [Unchanged]
(As amended Nov. 1, 1977, P. L. 95-151, § 10, 91 Stat. 1252.)
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
Amendments:
1977. Act Nov. 1, 1977, (effective 1/1/78; see § 15(a) of such Act at 29 USCS § 203 note),
in subsec. (b), inserted a new second sentence, beginning "Any employer who" and ending
"as liquidated damages", in the new third, former second, sentence, substituted "An action
to recover the liability prescribed in either of the preceding sentences" for "Action to
recover such liability, and in the last sentences, inserted "(1)", and added "or (2) legal or
equitable relief in sought as a result of alleged violations of section 15(a)(3)."; and, in
subsec. (c), in the third sentence, substituted "to recover the liability specified in the first
sentence of such subsection" for "an action by or on behalf of any employee".
Transfer of functions:
Section 1 of 1978 Reorg. Plan No. 1 of Feb. 23, 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 19807, provided:
"Transfer of Equal Pay Enforcement Functions
"All functions related to enforcing or administering Section 6(d) of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, as amended, (29 U.S.C. 206(d) [29 USCS § 206(d)]) are hereby transferred
to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Such functions include, but shall not
be limited to, the functions relating to equal pay administration and enforcement now
vested in the Secretary of Labor, the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the
Department of Labor, and the Civil Service Commission pursuant to Sections 4(d)(1); 4(f);
9; 11 (a), (b), and (c); 16 (b) and (c) and 17 of the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended,
(29 U.S.C. 204(d)(1); 204(0; 209; 211 (a), (b), and (c); 216 (b) and (c) and 217 [29 USCS
§§ 204(d)(1), (0, 209, 211(aHc), this section, 217]), and Section 10(b)(1) of the Portal-toPortal Act of 1947, as amended, (29 U.S.C 259) [29 USCS § 259(b)(1)]).".
Other provisions:
Liability and deferred payment. Act Nov. 13, 1985, P. L. 99-150, § 2(c)(1), 99 Stat. 788,
effective April 15, 1986, as provided by § 6 of such Act, which appears as 29 USCS § 203
note, provides: "No State, political subdivision of a State, or interstate governmental
agency shall be liable under section 16 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 [this
section] for a violation of section 6 (in the case of a territory or possession of the United
States), 7, or 11(c) [29 USCS §§206, 207 or 211(c)] (as it relates to section 7 [29 USCS
207]) of such Act occurring before April 15, 1986, with respect to any employee of the
State, political subdivision, or agency who would not have been covered by such Act under
the Secretary of Labor's special enforcement policy on January 1, 1985, and published in
sections 775.2 and 775.4 of title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations.".
Effect of 1985 amendments. Act Nov. 13, 1985, P. L. 99-150, §7, 99 Stat. 791, effective
April 15, 1986, as provided by § 6 of such act, which appears as 29 USCS §203 note,
provides: "The amendments made by this Act [adding this note and 29 USCS §§ 201 and
215 notes and amending 29 USCS §§ 203, 207 and 211] shall not affect whether a public
agency which is a State, political subdivision of a State, or an interstate governmental
agency is liable under section 16 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 [this section] for
a violation of section 6, 7, or 11 of such Act [29 USCS §§206, 207 or 211] occurring
before April 15, 1986, with respect to any employee of such public agency who would have
been covered by such Act under the Secretary of Labor's special enforcement policy on
January 1, 1985, and published in section 775.3 of title 29 of the Code of Federal
Regulations.".
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
29 CFR Parts 579, 580.
Add:
29 CFR Parts 778, 1620.
RESEARCH GUIDE

§ 260.

Liquidated damages

In any action commenced prior to or on or after the date of the enactment
of this Act [May 14, 1947] to recover unpaid minimum wages, unpaid
overtime compensation, or liquidated damages, under the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 USCS §§ 201-216, 217-219, 557],
if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that the act or
omission giving rise to such action was in good faith and that he had
reasonable grounds for believing that his act or omission was not a
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 USCS
§§201-216, 217-219, 557], the court may, in its sound discretion, award
no liquidated damages or award any amount thereof not to exceed the
amount specified in section 16 of such Act [29 USCS § 216].
(May 14, 1947, c. 52, Part IV, § 11, 61 Stat 89; Apr. 8, 1974, P. L. 93259, § 6(d)(2)(b), 88 Stat. 62.)
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
Amendments:
1974. Act Apr. 8, 1974, deleted "(b)" following "section 16" in this
section.
556
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before any part thereof shall be paid. The person contesting shall be made a party defendant in any such
action and shall have the right to contest such claim,
and the prevailing party shall recover proper costs.
1969

34-26-4. " W a g e s " defined.
Whenever used in this chapter, "wages" shall mean
all amounts due the employee for labor or services,
whether the amount is fixed or ascertained on a time,
task, piece, commission basis or other method of calculating such amount.
1969
CHAPTER 27
A T T O R N E Y S ' F E E S IN SUITS FOR WAGES
Section
34-27-1.

Reasonable amount — Taxed as costs.

34-27 1. R e a s o n a b l e amount — Taxed a s costs.
Whenever a mechanic, artisan, miner, laborer, servant, or other employee shall have cause to bring suit
for wages earned and due according to the terms of
his employment and shall establish by the decision of
the court that the amount for which he has brought
suit is justly due. and that a demand has been made
in writing at least fifteen days before suit was
brought for a sum not to exceed the amount so found
due. then it shall be the duty of the court before
which the case shai) he tried to aUow to the plaintiff'a
reasonable attorneys' fee in addition to the amount
found dur for wages, to be taxed as costs of suit. 1969
C H A P T E R 28
P A Y M E N T O F WAGES
Section
34-28-1.

Public and certain other employments
excepted.
34-28-2.
Definitions.
34-28-3.
Regular paydays — Currency or negotiable checks required — Deposit in
financial institution — Statement of
total deductions — Unlawful withholding or diversion of wages.
34-28-4.
Notice of paydays — Failure to notify a
misdemeanor.
34-28-5.
Separation from payroll — Resignation
— Cessation because of industrial dispute.
34-28-6.
Dispute over wages — Notice and payment.
34-28-7.
Payment at more frequent intervals permitted — Agreements to contravene
act prohibited.
34-28-8.
Subcontractors — Compliance with act.
34-28-9
Enforcement of chapter.
34-28-10.
Employers' records — Inspection by
commission.
34-28-11.
Commission may employ assistants.
34-28-12.
Violations — Misdemeanor.
34-28-13.
Assignment of wage claims — Powers of
commission — Award of attorneys'
fees.
34-28-14.
Actions by commission as assignee —
Costs need not be advanced.
34-28-15 to 34-28-18. Repealed.
34-28-19.
Retaliation prohibited — Resolution of
cease and desist orders.
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34-28-1.

P u b l i c and c e r t a i n o t h e r e m p l o y m e n t s
excepted.
None of the provisions of this chapter shall apply to
the state, or to any county, incorporated city or town,
or other political subdivision, or to employers and employees engaged in farm, dairy, agricultural, viticultural or horticultural pursuits or to stock or poultry
raising, or to household domestic service, or to any
other employment where an agreement exists between employer and employee providing for different
terms of payment, except the provisions of Section
34-28-5 shall apply to employers or employees engaged in farm, dairy, agricultural, viticultural, horticultural or stock or poultry raising.
1973
34-28-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) The word "employer includes every person,
firm, partnership, association, corporation, receiver
or other officer of a court of this state, and any
agent or officer of any of the above-mentioned
classes, employing any person in this state.
(2) The word "wages" means all amounts due the
employee for labor or services, whether the amount
is fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece, commission basis or other method of calculating such
amount.
1969
34-28-3.

R e g u l a r p a y d a y s — C u r r e n c y or negotiable c h e c k s r e q u i r e d — Deposit in fin a n c i a l institution — S t a t e m e n t of
total d e d u c t i o n s — Unlawful withholding or d i v e r s i o n of w a g e s .
(1) Employers shall pa\ the wages earned by the
employee semimonthly or twice during each calendar
month on days to be designated in advance by the
employer as the regular payday. The employer shall
pay for services rendered during each semimonthly
period within ten days after the close of that period. If
the semimonthly payday falls on a Saturday, Sunday,
or legal holiday, payment ot wages earned during the
semimonthly period shall be made on the day preceding the Saturday. Sunday, or legal holiday If the employer hires employees on a yearly salary basis, the
employer may pay the employee on a monthly basis
by paying on or before the seventh of the month following the month for which services were rendered.
All wages shall be paid in full to the employee in
lawful money of the United States, or checks on
banks convertible into cash on demand at full face
value.
(2) No person, firm, corporation, agent, or officer
shall issue in payment of wages due or as an advance
on wages to be earned for services performed or to be
performed within this state any order, check or draft
unless it is negotiable and payable in cash, on demand, without discount, at a bank, the name and
address of which must appear on the
instrument.
(3) If an employee voluntarily authorizes an employer to deposit wages due. or an advance on wages
to be earned, in a bank, savings and loan association,
credit union or other financial institution, the employer may so deposit until the authorization is terminated.
(4) If any deduction is made from the wages paid,
the employer shall, either semimonthly or monthly at
the employer's option, furnish the employee with a
statement showing the total amount of each deduction.
(5) It is unlawful lor an employer to withhold or
divert part of an employee's wages unless the employer is required to withhold or divert the wages by
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34-28-9

court order, state or federal law, or unless the employee expressly authorizes the deduction in writing,
or the employer presents evidence which in the opinion of the hearing officer or the administrative law
judge would warrant an offset.
(6) It is unlawful for an employer to require an
employee to rebate, refund, offset, or return any part
of the wage, salary, or compensation to be paid to the
employee except as provided in Subsection (5).
(7) An employer is not prohibited from pursuing
legitimate claims of damages, offsets, or recoupments
in a civil action against an employee.
1989

other guaranty held by the employer for the faithful
performance of the duties of the employment.
19^9

34-28-4.

34-28-7.

Notice of paydays — Failure to notify a
misdemeanor.
(1) It shall be the duty of every employer to notify
his employees at the time of hiring of the day and
place of payment, of the rate of pay, and of any
change with respect to any of these items prior to the
time of the change. Alternatively, however, every employer shall have the option of giving such notification by posting these facts and keeping them posted
conspicuously at or near the place of work where such
posted notice can be seen by each employee as he
comes or goes to his place of work.
(2) Failure to post and to keep posted any notice or
failure to give notice as prescribed in this section
shall be deemed a misdemeanor and punishable as
SUCh.

34-28-5.

1969

S e p a r a t i o n from payroll — Resignation
— C e s s a t i o n because of industrial dispute.
(1) (a) Whenever an employer separates an employee from his payroll the unpaid wages of the
employee become due immediately, and the employer shall pay the wages to the employee
within 24 hours of the time of separation at the
specified place of payment.
(b» This section does not apply to the earnings
of a sales agent employed on a commission basis
who has custody of accounts, money, or goods of
his principal if the net amount due the agent is
determined only after an audit or verification of
sales, accounts, funds, or stocks.
(2) In case of failure to pay wages due an employee
within 24 hours of written demand, the wages of the
employee shall continue from the date of demand
until paid, but in no event to exceed 60 days, at the
same rate which the employee received at the time of
separation. The employee may recover the penalty
thus accruing to him in a civil action. This action
must be commenced within 60 days from the date of
separation. Any employee who has not made a written demand for payment is not entitled to any penalty
under this subsection.
(3) If an employee does not have a written contract
for a definite period and resigns his employment, the
wages earned become due and payable not later than
72 hours after the resignation, unless the employee
gave 72 hours previous notice of his intention to resign, in which case the employee shall receive his
wages at the specified place of payment at the time of
resignation.
(4) If work ceases as the result of an industrial dispute, the wages earned and unpaid at the time of this
cessation become due and payable at the next regular
payday, as provided in Section 34-28-3, including,
without abatement or reduction, all amounts due all
persons whose work has been suspended as a result of
the industrial dispute, together with any deposit or

34-28-6.

Dispute over w a g e s — Notice and payment.
In case of a dispute over wages, the employer shall
give written notice to the employee of the amount of
wages which he concedes to be due and shall pay such
amount without condition within the time set by this
chapter; but acceptance by the employee of any such
payment made shall not constitute a release as to the
balance of his claim.
i%9
Payment at m o r e frequent intervals
permitted — Agreements to contravene act prohibited.
Nothing contained in this chapter shall in any way
limit or prohibit the payment of wages or compensation at more frequent intervals, or in greater
amounts or in full when or before due, but no provisions of this act can in any way be contravened or set
aside by a mutual agreement
1969
34-28-8.

Subcontractors — Compliance with
act.
Whenever any person shall contract with another
for the performance of work, then it shall be the duty
of such person to provide in the contract that all
wages earned pursuant to the contract shall be paid
in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, and
in the event that any wages earned under the contract shall not be paid as required in this act, such
person shall be civilly liable for all wages for work
performed under such contract in the same manner
as if the employees entitled to such wages were directly employed by such person.
i9«9
34-28-9. E n f o r c e m e n t of c h a p t e r .
(li (a> The Industrial Commission shall ensure
compliance with this chapter, investigate any alleged violations of this chapter, and determine
the validity of any claim for any violation of this
chapter filed with it by an employee.
(b) The amount of $50 constitutes the minimum wage claim that the commission may accept.
(c) The wage claim must be filed within one
year of the date the wages were earned.
(2) The Industrial Commission may assess against
an employer who fails to pay an employee in accordance with this chapter, a penalty of 5% of the unpaid
wages owing to the employee which shall be assessed
daily until paid for a period not to exceed 20 days.
The Industrial Commission shall retain 50% of the
money received from the penalty payments for the
costs of administering this chapter, and the Industrial Commission shall pay all such sums so received
to the state treasurer. The remaining 50% shall be
paid to the employee.
(3) (a) An abstract of any final award may be filed
in the office of the clerk of the district court of
any county in the state. If so filed, it shall be
docketed in the judgment docket of that district
court.
(b) The time of the receipt of the abstract shall
be noted by the clerk and entered in the judgment docket.
(c) If filed and docketed, the award constitutes
a lien from the time of the docketing upon the
real property of the employer situated in the
county for a period of eight years from the date of
the award unless previously satisfied.
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nal to the party conducting the deposition, and shall
deliver copies to the other parties requesting the
same The reporter shall then file a certificate with
the clerk of the court certifying to whom the original
and copies were delivered and the dates they were
delivered Any party moving for the publication of a
deposition shall provide the court with the original or
copy in the party's possession at the time the motion
to publish is made
(5) All parties shall be entitled to conduct discovery proceedings in accordance with this rule All discovery proceedings shall be completed, including all
responses thereto, and all depositions and other documents filed with the court no later than thirty (30)
days before the date set for trial of the case The right
to conduct discovery proceedings within thirty (30)
days before trial shall be within the discretion of the
court Motions to conduct discovery within thirty (30)
days before trial shall be presented to the judge assigned to the case upon notice to the other parties in
the action In exercising its discretion, the court shall
take into consideration the necessity and reasons for
such discovery, the diligence or lack of diligence of
the parties seeking such discovery, whether permitting such discovery will prevent the case from going
to trial on the scheduled date, or result in prejudice to
any party Nothing herein shall preclude or limit the
voluntary exchange of information or discovery by
stipulation of the parties at any time prior to the date
set for trial, but in no event shall such exchanges or
stipulations require a court to grant a continuance of
the trial date
R u l e 4-503. R e q u e s t s for j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s .
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting
and requesting jury instructions
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to the District and Circuit
Courts
S t a t e m e n t of t h e R u l e :
(1) All jury instruction requests shall be presented
to the court 10 days prior to the scheduled trial date
unless otherwise ordered by the court At the time of
presentation to the court, a copy of the requested instructions shall be furnished to opposing counsel
(2) J u r y instruction requests must be in writing
and state m full the instruction requested Each request shall be upon a separate sheet of paper, the
original and copies of which shall be free from red
lines and firm names and shall be entitled
"Instruction No.

"

The number of the request shall be written m lead
pencil
(3) If case citations are used in support of a requested instruction, a t least one copy of the requested
instruction furnished to the court shall be submitted
without the citations Citations may be provided upon
separate sheets attached to the particular instruction
to which the citation applies
R u l e 4-504. Written o r d e r s , j u d g m e n t s a n d d e crees.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting
written orders, judgments, and decrees to the court
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all courts of record and not
of record
Statement of the Rule:

666

(1) In all rulings by a court counsel for the part\
or parties obtaining the ruling shall within fifteen
(15) days or within a shorter time as the court ma\
direct file with the court a proposed order judgment
or decree in conformity with the ruling
(2) Copies of the proposed findings judgments and
orders shall be served upon opposing counsel before
being presented to the court for signature unless the
court otherwise orders Notice of objections shall be
submitted to the court and counsel within five (5)
days after service
(3) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall
also be reduced to writing and presented to the court
for signature within fifteen (15) days of the settle
ment and dismissal
(4) Upon entrv of judgment notice of such judg
ment shall be served upon the opposing party and
proof of such service shall be filed with the court All
judgments, orders, and decrees, or copies thereof,
which are to be transmitted after signature by the
judge, including other correspondence requiring a reply, must be accompanied by pre-addressed envelopes
and pre-paid postage
(5) All orders, judgments, and decrees shall be prepared m such a manner as to show whether they are
entered upon the stipulation of counsel, the motion of
counsel or upon the court's own initiative and shall
identify the attorneys of record in the cause or proceeding in which the judgment, order or decree is
made
(6) Except where otherwise ordered, all judgments
and decrees shall contain the address or the last
known address of the judgment debtor and the social
security number of the judgment debtor if known
(7) All judgments and decrees shall be prepared as
separate documents and shall not include any matters by reference unless otherwise directed by the
court Orders not constituting judgments or decrees
may be made a part of the documents containing the
stipulation or motion upon which the order is based
(8) No orders judgments, or decrees based upon
stipulation shall be signed or entered unless the stipulation is in writing signed by the attorneys of record
for the respective parties and filed with the clerk or
the stipulation was made on the record
(9) In all cases where judgment is rendered upon a
written obligation to pay money and a judgment has
previously been rendered upon the same written obligation, the plaintiff or plaintiff's counsel shall attach
to the new complaint a copy of all previous judgments
based upon the same written obligation
R u l e 4-505. Attorneys* fees affidavits.
Intent:
To establish uniform criteria and a uniform format
for affidavits in support of attorneys' fees
Applicability
This rule shall govern the award of attorneys' fees
in the trial courts
S t a t e m e n t of t h e Rule*
(1) Affidavits in support of an award of attorneys'
fees must set forth specifically the legal basis for the
award, the nature of the work performed by the attorney, the number of hours spent to prosecute the claim
to judgment or the time spent in pursuing the matter
to the stage for which attorneys' fees are claimed, and
affirm the reasonableness of the fees for comparable
legal services The affidavit must also separately
state hours by persons other t h a n attorneys, for time
spent, work completed and hourly rate billed
(2) If the fee arrangement with the client is other
t h a n at an hourly rate an affidavit of the client or
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correspondence from the client shall be filed with the
court setting forth the terms and conditions of the
arrangement, whether a flat rate or contingent fee, or
the percentage of funds recovered or dealt with.
(3) If judgment is being taken by default for a principal sum which it is expected will require considerable additional work to collect, the following phrase
may be included in the judgment after an award consistent with the time spent to the point of default
judgment, to cover additional fees incurred in pursuit
of collection:
"AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT
THIS JUDGMENT SHALL BE AUGMENTED IN THE AMOUNT OF REASONABLE
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES EXPENDED IN COLLECTING SAID JUDGMENT BY EXECUTION OR OTHERWISE
AS SHALL BE ESTABLISHED BY AFFIDAVIT."
(4) Judgments for attorney's fees should not be
awarded except as they conform to the provisions of
this rule.
Rule 4-506. Withdrawal of counsel in civil cases.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure and criteria for
withdrawal of counsel in civil cases.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all trial courts of record and
not of record.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) An attorney may withdraw as counsel of record
in all cases except where withdrawal would result in
a delay of trial. In that case, an attorney may not
withdraw without the approval of the court.
(2) When an attorney withdraws as counsel of
record, written notice of the withdrawal must be
served upon the client of the withdrawing attorney
and upon all other parties not in default and a certificate of service must be filed with the court. If a trial
date has been set, the notice of withdrawal served
upon the client shall include a notification of the trial
date.
(3) When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended or withdraws from the case or ceases to act as
an attorney, opposing counsel must notify the unrepresented client of his/her responsibility to retain another attorney or appear in person before opposing
counsel can initiate further proceedings against the
client.
Rule 4-507. Disposition of funds on trustee's
sale.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for filing trustee
affidavits of deposit and claimant petitions for adjudication of priority in trustee's sales.
To establish a uniform procedure in determining
the disposition of funds on trustee's sales.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all courts of record.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) At the time of depositing with the Clerk of the
Court any proceeds from a trustee's sale in accordance with Utah Code Ann. Section 57-1-29, the
trustee shall file an affidavit with the clerk setting
forth the facts of the deposit and a list of all known
claimants, including known addresses. The clerk
shall notify the listed claimants within 10 days of
receiving the affidavit of deposit.
(2) Any claimant may then file a petition for adjudication of priority to these funds and request a hear-

Rule 4-601

ing before the court. The petitioner requesting the
hearing shall give notice of the hearing to all claimants listed in the trustee's affidavit of deposit and any
others known to the petitioner. All persons having or
claiming an interest must appear and assert their
claim or be barred thereafter.
(3) Pursuant to the determination hearing, the
court will establish the priorities of the parties to the
trustee's sale proceeds and enter an order with the
clerk of the court or county treasurer directing the
disbursement of funds as determined.
ARTICLE 6.
CRIMINAL PRACTICE.
Rule 4-601. Victims and witnesses.
Intent:
To establish procedures which ensure that victims
and witnesses of crime are treated with dignity, respect, courtesy, and sensitivity.
To establish procedures which ensure that child
victims and child witnesses of crime are treated with
consideration for their age and maturity and in a
manner that is the least traumatic, intrusive or intimidating.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to the judiciary, prosecutors,
defense counsel, and law enforcement and corrections
personnel in all felony cases in and all misdemeanor
cases where personal injury is sustained by the victim. This rule also applies to all individuals who have
been subpoenaed or called to testify as witnesses in
any criminal proceeding.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) At the time of the arraignment or preliminary
hearing, or as soon thereafter as possible, the prosecuting agency shall provide written verification to
the court that all victims and witnesses have been
informed of their responsibilities during the criminal
proceedings and that those proceedings have been explained to them in a manner which is understandable, given the age and maturity of the victims and
witnesses.
(2) At the time of the arraignment or preliminary
hearing, or as soon thereafter as possible, the prosecuting agency shall provide written verification to
the court that all victims and witnesses have been
informed of their right to be free from threats, intimidation and harm by anyone seeking to induce the
victim or witness to testify falsely, withhold testimony or information, avoid legal process, secure the
dismissal of or prevent the filing of a criminal complaint, indictment or information. At that time and
where facilities are available, the prosecuting agency
shall provide written verification to the court that the
victims and witnesses have been informed of their
right to a separate waiting area.
(3) Unless otherwise waived in writing, the prosecuting agency shall provide notice to all victims of the
date and time of scheduled hearings, trial and sentencing and of their right to be present during those
proceedings and any other public hearing unless they
are subpoenaed to testify as a witness and the exclusionary rule is invoked.
(4) The informational rights of victims and witnesses contained in paragraphs (1) through (3) of this
rule are contingent upon their providing the prosecuting agency and court with their current telephone
numbers and addresses.
(5) The written verification filed with the magistrate shall be transferred with the case file to the

